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ABSTRACT 
This article researches populism, more specifically, Modern American Populism 
(MAP), constructed of white, rural, and economically oppressed reactionarianism, which was 
borne out of the political upheaval of the 1960’s Civil Rights movement. The research looks 
to explain the causes of populism and what leads voters to support populist movements and 
populist politicians. The research focuses on economic anxiety as a necessary trigger but also 
examines the alternative theory of racial resentment. In an effort to answer the question, what 
causes populist movements and motivations, I apply a research approach that utilizes 
qualitative and quantitative methods. There is an examination of literature that defines 
populism, its causes, and a detailed discussion of the case studies involved, including the 
1972 election of Richard Nixon; the Tea Party election of 2010; and the 2016 election of 
Donald Trump. In addition, statistical data analysis was run using American National 
Election Studies (ANES) surveys associated with each specific case study. These case studies 
were chosen because they most represent forms of populist movements in modern American 
history.  
 While ample qualitative evidence suggested support for the hypothesis that economic 
anxiety is a necessary condition for the populist voting patterns that elected Nixon, the Tea 
Party and Trump, the statistical data only supported the hypothesis in two cases, 2010 and 
2016, with 1972 coming back inconclusive. The data also suggested that both economic 
anxiety and racial resentment played a role in 2010 and 2016, with neither having a 
significant effect in 1972. This suggests that further research needs to be conducted into 
additional populist case studies, as well as an examination into the role economic anxiety and 
economic crises play on racial resentment and racially motivated voting behavior.  
 1 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“The political caste [can] go fuck itself.” Beppe Grillo1  
 
 The pervading interpretation surrounding the recent populist surge across the globe, 
and more specifically, within the United States, is that populism is on the march once again. 
Many assume that it is just another blip, a fleeting moment in the landscape of American 
politics and is just another incendiary form of a movement of predicated on reactionary 
politics. Like its populist predecessors, The People’s Party, Andrew Jackson, Huey Long and 
Charles Coughlin, it is an unsustainable force of popular rebellion and like all populist 
movements, it will be but a momentary setback for elitist and technocratic governments as 
they defend their pragmatic legitimacy. But, what if this time, the populist revolt isn’t just the 
manifestation and magnification of short-term public hostility or cultural and social 
resentments? What if it is the result of a slumbering populism founded in the aftermath of the 
Civil Rights movement and underpinned by the political realignment of the 1968 election? I 
argue that the common interpretation that populism is “back” is incorrect, because populism 
never left. Since 1968, movements have gone dormant and politicians have shed populism as 
an explicit ideology, but they have continued to utilize its rhetorical strategies, and populist 
attitudes never receded in the conscience of certain voters, specifically, those tending towards 
anti-elitist sentiments. And this populism, known as Modern American Populism (MAP), is 
not driven primarily by simple hostilities or social and cultural resentments, but its motivated 
and predicated on economic issues; anxiety, inequality, and perceptions of unfairness. It’s 
also driven by a sense of white social decline and economically oppressed rural Americans.  
                                                 
1 Mounk, Yascha. “Pitchfork Politics: the Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy.” Foreign Aff. 93 (2014): 27. 
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The purpose of this research is to trace the formation, foundations, occurrences, and 
logic behind MAP and test the hypothesis that populism is caused by the existence of 
economic anxiety and conditions of socio-economic crisis rather than social and cultural 
issues. I will use multiple methods to test my hypotheses, including an examination of three 
historical case studies and statistical analysis of public opinion and vote choice during those 
three periods. I will establish the theory through the examination and then test it through 
statistical analysis for either confirmation or rejection of the hypothesis. It takes into account 
already established research on the topic while adding to it in the form of case study 
specification and statistical analysis that tests the theory of MAP for validity. In general, I 
find this to be a well-balanced approach that combines qualitative and quantitative methods 
which I believe is vital in social science research.  
In Chapter 2, I discuss of various theoretical frameworks, approaches and scholarly 
definitions of populism, especially as they’re applied to right-wing formulations. I have not 
included left-wing populism, because in the United States, it simply has not achieved the 
same level of success as its Latin American counterparts, either electorally or in policy 
changes. Unlike MAP, instances of left-wing populism since the 1960’s, including George 
McGovern, Jimmy Carter and Occupy Wall Street, have been brief, tepid, and typically 
unsuccessful. Through this theoretical discussion, I settle on defining MAP as an anti-elitist, 
homogenous, popular backlash that utilizes an ‘us vs. them’ strategy which purifies the 
people as the ‘in-group’ (white, rural, poor, traditional values) while excluding others, or the 
‘out-group’ (the ruling elites, immigrants, the establishment). It also requires the occurrence, 
or continuation of economic distress or crisis to trigger the populist attitudes of the ‘in-group’ 
who, in the midst of an economic crisis, have cause to turn their resentments, into a force of 
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critique and an effective revolt. Chapter 2 also includes an examination of prior research into 
the causes of populism, including evidence for economic causes, and the secondary cause of 
declining support for democracy among democratized nations, as well as racial causes. 
In Chapter 3, there is a rundown of the methods used to test the hypothesis that 
economic anxiety is necessary for populism to occur. The methods include a review of three 
case studies and their underlying causes, as well as, statistical analysis of all three case 
studies testing the economics thesis utilizing American National Election Studies (ANES) 
and the 2010-2012 Evaluations of Government and Society study.  
In Chapter 4, I discuss all three case studies - the 1972 election of Richard Nixon, or 
more specifically, the ‘Silent Majority,’ the Tea Party and the 2010 mid-term elections, and 
the 2016 election of Donald Trump and the arrival of Trumpism. The first case study 
concerning the Silent Majority, discusses the logic behind 1972 as the demarcation point 
between death of old style populism and birth of MAP, the motivations of the Silent Majority 
in electing Nixon and their economic circumstances which precipitated the rise of economic 
populism. The Tea Party section will discuss its causes, such as the Great Recession which 
began with the economic collapse of 2008, the declining social status of white America, the 
rural attachment to populism, and the electoral success of the movement in the 2010 mid-
term election cycle based on economic factors, such as rising income inequality and the 
perceived unfair distribution of economic assistance. The final case study, examines the 2016 
Presidential election, Donald Trump’s triumph over Hillary Clinton and the foundations of 
Trumpism, the next epoch in MAP. This case study also discusses the rise in economic 
anxiety rooted in the failures of neoliberal policies and establishment institutions to maintain 
prosperity in an interconnected and globalized world and the political neglect by the ruling 
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elites. It also investigates the economic decline and challenges facing the poorest and most 
vulnerable citizens who are also the most likely to hold populist beliefs or vote for populist 
candidates. Combined, the three case studies demonstrate the sustainability, adaptability and 
transformational nature of modern populist politics. The addition of the historical research 
and scholarly literature is vital to provide background on populism, its causes, and the 
specific case studies as well as provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis and data 
analysis.  
Following the case studies in Chapter 5, the results of the statistical analysis which 
used the aforementioned data sets will be discussed, either confirming or rejecting the 
hypothesis that MAP and the included case studies were caused by economic factors. Finally, 
Chapter 6 will conclude the research, examine the findings, and discuss whether further 
research is required on the subject and if so, what should that entail.  
The importance of this research is to underscore the realities of economic decline, 
whether real or imagined, as neoliberalism and globalization advance without pause and the 
consequences associated with that advancement. MAP, at the very least, highlights some of 
the casualties of newly emergent technocratic regimes and the continuation of the 
mechanization of labor, as well as rising income inequality, wealth disparity, and financial 
opportunities, all of which have formed the basis of populist support pre-dating the 
demarcation point of 1972. While this paper does not discuss this demarcation in exhaustive 
detail, it’s the chosen point because of the political realignment post-Civil Rights legislation 
and, according to the stated hypothesis, it should mark the point where economic 
justifications overtook social and cultural ones for supporting and voting for populist 
movements. What is occurring is a disenchantment and a loss of faith in economic policies 
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and politicians who have oversold and under-delivered, which has provided the impetus for 
MAP to be born and remain a force, whether large (Nixon, Tea Party, Trumpism) or small 
(Pat Buchanan, Ronald Reagan, Contract with America), within American politics since the 
1960’s.  
It should also be of interest because MAP and more specifically, Trumpism suggests 
American politics is undergoing another upheaval or realignment, as political paradigms and 
traditional modes of understanding and interpreting the political landscape have been swept 
away under a torrent of populist backlash. American politics and the two-party system has 
entered a turning point where it will either respond effectively to the recurring problem of 
economic crisis and solve the issue with policies that actually benefit the people or Trumpism 
could be the manifestation of a new political age which extends beyond the borders of the 
United States. Rather than ending with a whimper, the long, slow march of MAP, regardless 
of its causes, could see the end of the era where “the powerful do what they wish and the 
weak suffer what they must”2 and give rise to what Roger Griffin described as:  
“… a revolutionary form of nationalism, one that sets out to be a political, 
social and ethical revolution, welding the “people” into a dynamic national 
community under new elites infused with heroic values. The core myth that 
inspires this project is that only a populist, trans-class movement of purifying, 
cathartic national rebirth can stem the tide of decadence.”3  
 Finally, the significance of this research, addressing the causes and conditions 
of populism will allow, in theory, the ability of governments, politicians and the 
                                                 
2 As quoted in Chomsky, Noam. Hopes and prospects. (Haymarket Books, 2010), 16. 
3 Frank, Stephanie. "The sacred in twentieth‐century politics. Essays in honour of Professor Stanley G. Payne. By R. Griffin, R. Mallett and 
J. Tortorice (eds)." International Social Science Journal 61, no. 200‐201 (2010): 325-328. 
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ruling elite, to focus policies on resolving those issues. For example, if populism is 
caused by racial resentment, policy needs to be dictated towards remedies such as 
further equality, diversity, and legislation designed to improve race relations. Perhaps, 
it becomes necessary to engage in further dialogue regarding minority centered 
legislation, identity politics and social constructions that give the appearance of racial 
preference to populist voters. Additionally, if racial resentment is the primary cause, 
there needs to be a reassessment of what causes sentiments of racism and prejudice 
and what more needs to be done in terms of combating this problem. Furthermore, 
should racism be the cause, it accepts the argument that economic conditions are of 
little, to no concern and no longer require significant attention because this is only a 
symptom of a bigoted nation clinging to its final grasp of power in a growing 
multicultural society. It is important to note, that racial resentment is not the same as 
racism. Racial resentment is typically devoid of biological factors and skin color, but 
premised on the appearance of economic advantages being given to specific racial 
categories.  
 However, if economic anxiety and economic circumstances are necessary for 
populism, then it falls on the ruling elites to admit mistakes have been made on the 
long road to neoliberalism and globalization. It suppresses the argument of racism, 
and draws attention to economic policies that created the conditions of anxiety, 
insecurity and decline and how they must be changed, altered or replaced. It’s also a 
more encompassing outcome, as economic policy has the potential to adversely affect 
the economically disadvantaged regardless of race. It means coming to grips with the 
argument that capitalism is a flawed economic theory and can’t not be defended by 
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simply dismissing the populist revolt as racist. It has the potential, in theory, to force 
the ruling elites, governments, and politicians to take action regarding the economic 
circumstances their citizens find themselves in, rather than scapegoating racism for 
populist feelings, allowing them to maintain the economic system which, in fact, is 
most responsible for the existence of populism. If it is economics, wholesale changes 
would have to be made to the way nations and governments engage in economics. 
Whereas, if it is racial resentment, it can be claimed that there is no economic anxiety, 
resulting in a business as usual approach because populism is simply a matter of 
individual citizen malfeasance, and not the malfeasance of governments and 
politicians.  
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CHAPTER 2. POPULISM DEFINED 
 
“These unhappy times call for the building of plans that rest upon the forgotten, the 
unorganized but the indispensable units of economic power for plans…that build from the 
bottom up and not from the top down, that put their faith once more in the forgotten man at 
the bottom of the economic pyramid.” FDR4  
In the discipline of political science, what constitutes populism has been debated and 
hotly contested, as scholars have gone back and forth, putting forward competing definitions 
and conceptualizations. This difficulty in settling on an accepted and operational definition 
has led some scholars, including Margaret Canovan, to declare the term “exceptionally 
vague” referring to a “bewildering variety of phenomena” easily attached to disparate 
movements regardless of legitimacy of the claim.5 Likewise, Grattan claims that part of the 
reason populism has been “notoriously” difficult to define is because of its lack of 
ideological dependency. But, Grattan also suggests that historically, regardless of how it has 
been defined, populism has tended to emerge in “disparate geopolitical contexts” and 
remains a cyclical feature of contemporary politics as a tactic for electoral mobilization.6  
Although vagueness appears characteristic to populist descriptions, there are shared 
commonalities among scholarly analysis with only minor or trivial dissimilarities. 
Accordingly, beginning with Philippe Schmitter’s definition, populism is a political 
movement that “seeks support beyond…the existing political parties” and procures support 
for a leader who claims to be capable of solving the problems that have historically eluded 
                                                 
4 Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Radio Address From Albany, New York: "The 'Forgotten Man' Speech"," April 7, 1932. Online by Gerhard Peters 
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88408. 
5 Canovan, Margaret. Populism. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt P, 1981, p. 3. 
6 Grattan, L. "Populism and rebellious cultures of democracy." Radical Future Pasts: Untimely Political Theory. Lexington, KY: University 
Press of Kentucky (2014): 179-216. 
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the abilities of the ruling elite. In Schmitter’s assessment, populism is defined by 14 
characteristics which are separated into seven virtues and seven vices. Of the more prominent 
virtues are its ability to recruit previously apathetic individuals into the political process, 
weaken party loyalties, replace outdated party programs, and maintain a mindful awareness 
of social needs, all of which are encompassed by Modern American Populism (MAP), and 
are primarily concerned with economic necessities. Of the most corrosive vices applicable to 
MAP, and specifically Trumpism, are the promotion of scapegoats for causing negative 
economic conditions, the use of misinformation, and the opportunistic nature which 
undermines party loyalties and programs without necessarily offering viable alternatives.7 A 
comparable approach is postulated by Weyland, who defines populism as a “political strategy 
[with] a personalistic leader [who] seeks or exercises government power based on direct, 
unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized 
followers.”8 Although this variant is more prominent in Latin American populism, because it 
is defined as a strategy and strategies are not geographically constrained, but are fully 
capable of transcending borders and ideological boundaries, it is also germane to American 
variations, such as MAP or right-wing populism.9 
As a strategy, MAP utilizes rhetoric that defines the political contest over who 
controls both material and symbolic resources and sets the parameters of the political field on 
which that contest will be fought.10 The content of that rhetoric is dependent on what 
                                                 
7 Pantelimon, Răzvan Victor. "„Populism and Neo-populism as the Main Characteristics of the XXIst Century Politics “." South-East 
European Journal of Political Science 2, no. 1-2 (1998): 121-152. 
8 Weyland, Kurt. "Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American politics." Comparative politics (2001): 1-22. 
9 Azari, J. (2017, November 1). The Political Geography of American Populism. In Global Populisms conference memos. Retrieved 
February 16, 2018, from https://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/azari_political_geography_of_populism_0.pdf 
10 Bourdieu, Pierre, and Samar Farage. "Rethinking the state: Genesis and structure of the bureaucratic field." Sociological theory 12, no. 1 
(1994): 1-18. 
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attributes the speaker has and how relatable they are to the audience and whether they have 
the credibility to connect with the experiences and narratives of the public to which they are 
appealing and contending for.11 The populist discourse, according to Knight, is a “loose style 
characteristically involving a proclaimed rapport with the people, [in] a ‘them-and-us’ 
mentality” often during a period of crisis and political mobilization.12 It is, by definition, a 
form of performance politics and a style that has become increasingly potent and prominent 
in the modern 24-hour media news cycle which has provided previously unavailable avenues 
for populists to seize on and “bring into being a subject called the people.”13 It is, as Canovan 
states, a style of politics which is not ordinary or routine but it “powered by the enthusiasm 
that draws normally unpolitical people into the political arena.”14  
The people, in almost every populist definition is “both the central audience [and] the 
subject that populists attempt to render present.” They are the true protectors of sovereignty, 
distinct from the elite, champion common sense, and are valorized against the crises caused 
by bureaucrats, technocrats, and the establishment.15 The people, representative of the “non-
privileged,” act against a perceived ‘enemy’ under an antagonistic worldview and they 
position themselves as protagonists, articulating “grievances against power-holders and 
oligarchs.”16 This antagonism towards the system allows for the division of society “between 
the dominant and the dominated,” providing political salience to the hegemonic appeals 
                                                 
11 Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. "Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization." International social movement 
research 1, no. 1 (1988): 197-217. 
12 Knight, Alan. "Populism and neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico." Journal of Latin American Studies 30, no. 2 (1998): 
223-248. 
13 Moffitt, Benjamin, and Simon Tormey. "Rethinking populism: Politics, mediatisation and political style." Political Studies 62, no. 2 
(2014): 381-397. 
14 Canovan, Margaret. "Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy." Political studies 47, no. 1 (1999): 2-16. 
15 Moffitt and Tormey, “Rethinking populism,” (2014). 
16 Katsambekis, Giorgos. "The Populist Surge in Post‐Democratic Times: Theoretical and Political Challenges." The Political Quarterly 88, 
no. 2 (2017): 202-210. 
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within populist political discourse.17 According to Katsambekis, populism is a construction 
of ‘the people’ which is “mono-ethnic” and composed of an organic community with a 
common culture and shared values that excludes the ‘others’ while including only those it 
deems as “native people,” which is fundamental to MAP.18   
Likewise, in a recent study, Pippa Norris, found that populism is comprised of three 
dimensions. It includes an appeal to popular sovereignty, is anti-establishment, and it 
requires a charismatic leader who represents the “voice of the ordinary people,” which is 
analogous to the vices of Schmitter’s analysis. Now, while this research focuses exclusively 
on the populism of the Right, Norris does not link populism to a particular ideology because 
whether it is left/right in orientation, at its core, populism is a “critique of liberal democracy” 
and is essentially about creating disruption and shattering the establishments “intellectual 
forms of power and hegemony,” and these ideas cut across ideological preferences.19  
Similar to Norris, Gino Germani, states that populism does not tend to classify itself 
in terms of the left/right dichotomy because it is a “multiclass movement,” but, he also points 
out that not all movements of this type should be considered populist. According to Germani, 
authentic populism is concerned with, and promotes claims for political equality and 
universal participation for common people. He also notes, much like other scholarly 
definitions, how it is instilled with a semblance of authoritarianism and defined by a 
charismatic leader who champions the “rights of the common people against the privileged 
interest groups.”20  
                                                 
17 Stavrakakis, Yannis. "Antinomies of formalism: Laclau's theory of populism and the lessons from religious populism in Greece." Journal 
of Political Ideologies 9, no. 3 (2004): 253-267. 
18 Katsambekis, “Populist Surge,” 204. 
19 Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. "Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash." (2016). 
20 Germani, Gino. Authoritarianism, fascism, and national populism. Transaction Publishers, 1978, p. 88. 
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This parallels with Boyte, who states the essence of populism, at the grassroots level, 
is “the idea that politics, owned by people, is the activity through which people…develop 
their power to shape the world.” In this context, it means the demonization of a common 
enemy, the use of inflammatory language and employing grievance style rhetoric that 
condemns the influence of corporations and market infiltrations throughout society. It is 
economic in nature, but at the sub-level, it also seeks the preservation of cultural traditions 
and narratives “that have been worn down…by dominant cultural dynamics” and acts as a 
source of anti-globalist radicalism intent on the political usurpation of the ruling class.21  
Relatedly, Mudde defines populism as an ideology that separates society into two 
homogenous and antagonistic groups, pitting the ‘pure people’ against the corrupt elite and 
Mudde argues that all politics becomes based on the general will of the people.22 In his 
assessment, populism acts as a “thin-centered ideology”23 which allows it to exist without a 
“pure form,” therefore, it can be constantly mixed and updated with other ideologies and 
transcend existing regional biases.24 Much like Mudde, William Brett, argues that populism 
is not dependent on a specific ideology to thrive, only that it includes an ‘us vs. them’ ethos 
in response to the “rise of individualism and consumerism,” both hallmarks of neoliberalism 
and globalization, which as it will be argued later on, are at the root of populist uprisings.25  
Furthermore, Plattner contends that populism embodies a vision of democracy that is 
not committed to liberalism or constitutionalism because it is typically fighting against the 
                                                 
21 Boyte, Harry C. Everyday politics: Reconnecting citizens and public life. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010, p. 21. 
22 Mudde, Cas. "The populist zeitgeist." Government and opposition 39, no. 4 (2004): 541-563. 
23 Mudde, Cas. Populist radical right parties in Europe. Vol. 22, no. 8. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 23. 
24 Moffitt and Tormey, “Rethinking populism,” (2014). 
25 Brett, William. "What's an elite to do? The threat of populism from left, right and centre." The Political Quarterly 84, no. 3 (2013): 410-
413. 
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beneficiaries of such systems, namely the wealthy and corporations. Consequently, it reduces 
all politics to a contest between “the rich and the rest.”26  
 However, for populists, especially within MAP, “the rest” or ‘the people’ are viewed 
as a homogenous or uniform group comprising a similar culture, economic standing, is 
overtly antagonistic and is imbued with all the features of nativism.27 Though critics portray 
nativism as openly hostile towards diversity and it is essential to the racism thesis discussed 
later, the promotion of nativism is not without historical precedent. In Federalist 2, John Jay 
described Americans as a “united people” who share the same 
“ancestors…language…religion…manners and customs.” Social critiques notwithstanding, 
populist movements embrace a harmonized worldview as indispensable to the progress of 
economic equality.28  
It should come as no surprise then that a contemporary definition of populism 
suggests that it is a movement of “revolutionary discourse…characterized by a mixture of 
forms of culture and ethnic nationalism”29 with subtle elements of cultural populism. 
Fundamentally, populism is the proliferation of associated political feelings while appealing 
to populist symbols for the purpose of generating a cultural paradigm with the intent of 
taking control over cultural production. Like socio-politically generated populism, cultural 
populism magnifies certain aspects of national identity and amplifies the dilemmas involved 
                                                 
26 Plattner, Marc F. "Populism, pluralism, and liberal democracy." Journal of Democracy 21, no. 1 (2010): 81-92. 
27 Ibid 
28 Rossiter, Clinton, ed. The Federalist Papers: Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay. New American Library, 1961, p. 38. 
29 Latifi, Venton. “The Populism of the Political Discourse. Metamorphoses of Political Rhetoric and Populism.” South-East European 
Journal of Political Science ,2(1), 173-192. Retrieved October 23, 2017, from http://seejps.lumina.org/index.php/volume-ii-number-1-2-
populism-and-its-metamorphoses/71-the-populism-of-the-political-discourse-metamorphoses-of-political-rhetoric-and-populism 
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in the neoliberal processes of “industrialization and democratization,” and intensifies the 
populist backlash when those processes come under duress.30  
At this point, let’s turn our attention to the latest incarnation of MAP, that of 
Trumpism which can be summed up as a populism that is “a form of politics predicated on 
[the] moral vilification of elites and a concomitant veneration of the common people”31  
captured by top-down, reactionary logics.32 It establishes binary constructions and 
classifications, essentially promoting a Manichean worldview that establishes an ‘us vs. 
them’ mentality, or as Laclau states, it is the “representation of popular-democratic 
interpellations as a synthetic antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology.”33 
Trumpism also closely aligns with Vladimir Tismaneanu’s definition, which views populism 
as a strategy that generates mass mobilization and support for a leader among “heterogeneous 
social groups” in opposition to the existing political establishment. The social group in this 
context is predominantly whites and the heterogeneity comes from whites within the 
movement representing both the urban and peasant classes. This newly established social 
group responds to the real and perceived economic inequalities and problems of 
modernization34 and its construction is closely associated with the psychological condition 
known as the “syndrome of disappointment” which arises as a consequence of cultural 
exhaustion, lost confidence, and an infiltration of democratic delusion among the masses.35 
                                                 
30 Nirel, L. R. “Populism or the Fear of Democracy Failure.” South-East European Journal of Political Science ,2(1), 315-328. Retrieved 
February 21, 2018, from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ion_Boboc/publication/261637390_Boboc_Populism_SEEJPS-II-1-
2/links/00b7d534e4fb5d76cf000000/Boboc-Populism-SEEJPS-II-1-2.pdf#page=319. 
31 Bonikowski, Bart, and Noam Gidron. “The populist style in American politics: Presidential campaign discourse, 1952–1996.” Social 
Forces 94, no. 4 (2015): 1593-1621. 
32 Grattan, “Populism,” 189. 
33 Laclau, Ernesto. "Towards a theory of populism." Politics and ideology in Marxist theory (1977): 143-200, p. 172-173. 
34 Tismaneanu, Vladimir. "Hypotheses on populism: The politics of charismatic protest." East European Politics and Societies15, no. 1 
(2000): 10-17. 
35 Dorna, Alexandre. Le populisme. PUF, 1999. 
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Once this point has been reached, populist movements will settle for nothing less than a 
complete renewal, transformation, or evolution of the political system.36  
Effectively, populism is a political ideology that divides society into two homogenous 
and antagonistic groups, the ordinary people and a corrupt elite and is the expression of the 
general will of the people, which in this case is the homogenized white social group as they 
pursue radical change. This is a common theme among all definitions of populism, as is the 
underlying cause that provokes the pursuit of radical change, explicitly, the declining 
financial circumstances and the lack of economic mobility open to citizens in a globalized 
market system that has effectively become atrophied.37  
Perhaps, the most relevant definition for MAP, from the Silent Majority to Trump, is 
provided by Donald MacRae and is worth quoting at length:  
“But surely, we will automatically and correctly use the term populist when, 
under the threat of some kind of modernization, industrialism, call it what you 
will, a predominantly agricultural segment of society asserts as its charter of 
political actions its belief in a community and (usually) a Volk as uniquely 
virtuous, it is egalitarian and against all and any elite, looks to a mythical past 
to regenerate the present and confounds usurpation and alien conspiracy, 
refuses to accept any doctrine of social, political or historical inevitability and, 
in consequence, turns to belief in an instant, imminent apocalypse mediated 
by the charisma of heroic leaders and legislators…If with all this we find a 
movement of short-term association for political ends to be achieved by state 
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intervention but not a real, serious political party, then populism is present in 
its most typical form.”38  
Before concluding, it is important to note a few criticisms of populism leveled by 
scholars. Richard Hofstadter, labeled populism a “paranoid style” that takes advantage of 
conditions of economic insecurity and anxiety to “distort people’s aspirations to power” 
leading to rebellious outbursts and defiant tendencies towards the ruling elites.39 
Additionally, Benjamin Arditi argues that when confronted with “anomie” that triggers the 
mobilization of populist movements, people “misrecognize the truth” and are unaware of the 
consequences of their actions. Arditi also takes exception with the prevalent nativism of 
populism, suggesting that all notions of restoring a lost sense of community is a “mythical” 
pursuit and nothing more. As such, supporters of populism are victims of the “promise of 
plentitudes” and populism, rather than fulfilling the social and political demands of its 
adherents, is a form of top-down politics conducted by unprincipled leaders to advance their 
own agenda.40 A final criticism is offered by Kenneth Roth, who refers to populism as a 
“cauldron of discontent” which relies on scapegoats, nativism, racism and xenophobia and he 
considers populism a political ideology founded on “unfettered majoritarianism” which will 
ultimately violate and erode the rights that protect the ‘other’ from becoming dispensable.41  
Finally, no discussion of populism is complete without covering Laclau’s On Populist 
Reason. While Laclau, like Canovan, has suggested that populism is “elusive and 
recurrent,”42 he also argues that populism is a political logic that seeks to bring about a 
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particular articulation of different elements in order to construct the unifying subject of ‘the 
people’ to mobilize against what are perceived as “unresponsive political institutions.”43 
Therefore, according to Laclau, populism is not dependent on its ideological content and 
should be defined instead on its form, as the construction of a ‘people’44 that struggles 
against the institutional system45 and institutionalized ‘other,’46 that are symbolically 
dividing society. Under this formulation, the people, or the “plebs who claim to be the only 
legitimate populus,”47 act as a political project that is entirely anti-status quo and consists of 
“postulating a radical alternative [when] the crossroads on which the future of a given 
society” have been reached.48 While it is being argued here that populism is a pre-existing 
condition, it cannot move beyond petty demagoguery49 without “some kind of de-
institutionalization that unsettles the old order” to spur its success as the politics of change.50  
As such, Laclau suggests there are three preconditions for populism to exist: first, 
there must be the creation of an “antagonistic frontier” that causes the formation of people 
versus the elites’ ethos; second, the people must articulate a set of demands that makes their 
existence possible; and third, once mobilization has been achieved, what follows should be 
the unification of the various demands into a “stable system of signification.”51  
In summation, the root cause of Trumpism and the materialization of social demands 
attached to MAP, is the:  
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“…experience of a lack, a gap which has emerged in the harmonious 
continuity of the social. [The] fullness of the community is missing [and] the 
construction of the ‘people’ will be the attempt to give a name to that absent 
fullness. Without this initial breakdown of something in the social 
order…there is no possibility of antagonism, frontier, or, ultimately, 
‘people’.52  
 
The Economics 
 
“Some degree of crisis…is a necessary precondition for populism.”53  
 
At the forefront of the recent surge in populist success is the very visceral reaction to 
globalism or globalization, which according to Jonathan Haidt, has given birth to a kind of 
“left behind thesis” for the working classes in Western societies. It’s a response to the 
promulgation of what’s termed “cosmopolitan attitudes” that shed traditions and pursues 
policies of progressive social engineering, eventually serving as a cosmopolitan “litmus 
tests” for moral respectability. This ignites populist passions, nationalist backlashes, and 
resentment towards the ideas of internationalism and universalism.54 According to Donald 
Tusk this has taken place because globalists were so obsessed with the idea of “total 
integration” that they failed to notice that ordinary people did not share the same enthusiasm 
for globalist policies.55 So, in effect, the populist surge is a direct result of the policies which 
led to the Great Recession and introduced the threats of rising inequality, increased economic 
volatility, increased frequency of crises, and the manufactured nature of booms and busts. All 
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of which has brought renewed intensity to the debate surrounding the crisis of democracy and 
whether it can sufficiently uphold its promise of power to the people56 and Trumpism, the 
latest movement in MAP, represents a “moment of rupture in the historical continuum [in] 
the present capitalist order” and has revealed it to be a “fundamentally bourgeois con.”57 As 
such, populism is not the source of democratic “degeneration” as some critic’s claim, but is 
in response to an already degenerating democracy58 and peels away what Carl Schmitt 
described as the “façade concealing the dominance of parties and economic interests” 
devoted to the neoliberal consensus59 - or what Wolin termed “formless forms” of democratic 
government.60   
According to Eva Anduiza, there are three factors that contribute to the formation of 
populist attitudes; personal vulnerability, objective personal economic decline, and 
sociotropic perceptions. The first, vulnerability, acts much like economic anxiety because it’s 
the byproduct of placing people in “competition over scarce resources” whereby the losers in 
this struggle suffer from some form of comparative dispossession. This competition is also an 
endemic cause of racial resentment as the Great Recession, coupled with the deleterious 
effects of globalization, triggered socioeconomic changes which produced losers of 
modernization and exacerbated class cleavages, leading to increased economic anxiety. The 
second factor of economic decline originates mainly from the “threat of deprivation” such as 
facing disadvantages from material strain, a reduction in basic goods and services, and being 
denied access to public assistance. The final factor, sociotropic perceptions, supports the 
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economic thesis on a national level61 and these perceptions have been confirmed in voting 
literature, most notably by Kinder and Kiewiet, who found a “prevalence of sociotropic 
perceptions” as they relate to the national economy and “pocketbook considerations” and 
their influence on voting behavior.62  
All of this, whether separately or combined, produces economic anxiety, which I 
argue, more than any other cause, is a necessary requirement for all MAP movements. It is 
central to the marginality and alienation white-working class voters feel towards their 
“economic obsolescence and social relegation.” It is fundamental to their belief that they 
have been “demoted” to the fringes of society and judged as social outcasts and these 
feelings and beliefs have morphed into a “sense of social deprivation” and isolation from the 
democratic process and from being fully represented. This assumed demotion, along with the 
sorting of society along socioeconomic lines and the reinforcement of economic immobility, 
leads to the type of “violent anti-system political behavior” currently engulfing Western 
democracies.63 This anxiety, especially for those professing right-leaning ideologies, leads to 
a retreat into economic nationalism, which according to Pia Malaney, is one of the strongest 
components of MAP and more specifically, the election of Trump. It should be noted that 
Malaney draws attention to the “racist rhetoric” that data suggests helped Trump during the 
primaries, but she also asserts that economic factors played a more important, and crucial 
role in the general election. Additionally, Malaney points out the economic anxiety of Trump 
voters is not based simply on attitudes of racial resentment, but on real world economic 
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consequences caused by immigration. As Malaney argues, immigration negatively impacts 
the white working-class who are most susceptible to populist ideology, as it “pushes out the 
supply curve of labor causing an increase in output” while simultaneously “decreasing 
wages, [leading] to a transfer of wealth from native workers to capital.” Moreover, citing the 
2016 Report of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, (NAS) 
Malaney draws attention to the social effects of immigration, namely in social spending, 
which according to the NAS report cost an estimated $279 billion in 2013 and costs such as 
this, place a burden on state and local governments which impacts wages, consequently 
heightening economic anxiety.64  
However, it’s not just about the direct, measurable effects, such as lost wages and job 
loss that translates into populist support, but there are also indirect economic harms, which 
cannot necessarily be measured, such as a reduction in economic security and stability or 
public feelings towards the “tearing of the fabric of civil society.” In fact, Malaney contends, 
that such indirect effects have been “systematically underestimated and neglected” because 
most research focuses solely on direct economic factors and ignores factors applied to 
“behavioral economics” or the “effect of loss” which eludes economic statistical modeling.65  
Moreover, the economic causes of Trumpism were evident in the 2015 American 
Values Survey (AVS) published by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI). Of the 
issues that the American people thought were most critical or important, ones tied to 
economic circumstances or ones directly related to rising economic anxiety were cited more 
than cultural or social concerns. Among the top issues, healthcare was important to 63-
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percent and jobs and unemployment came in at 60-percent. When that is combined with the 
72-percent of American’s who maintained a bleak economic outlook and believed the 
economy was still in a recession and the 51-percent who thought there was a “lack of 
opportunities for young people,” - including 45-percent of whites - there emerges a level of 
economic discontent favorable to the populist formation. Furthermore, challenging the notion 
that Trump’s base was only comprised of the well-to-do, the AVS found that 55-percent of his 
supporters were actually from the white working-class.66  
Even when social issues were discussed, such as immigration, negative views were 
expressed with and colored by, economic considerations and not basic racist logics. The 
negative views espoused by 80-percent of Trump supporters were linked to economic 
anxiety, citing issues such as jobs, housing and healthcare as the mitigating factor. This was 
also evidenced by who the American people blamed for the current economic conditions, as 
86-percent blamed corporations for outsourcing; 77-percent blamed corporations for 
“refusing to pay a fair wage;” 73-percent blamed unfair trade policies; and 69-prcent 
believed “burdensome government regulations” were the primary cause of the country’s 
economic problems. Meanwhile, the issues relevant to the forthcoming discussion of the 
racism thesis, were substantially lower, as only 54-percent attributed the problems to illegal 
immigrants. Interestingly, broken down by racial group, a majority of both white and black 
Americans, 54-percent and 52-percent respectively, believed illegal immigrants were 
responsible for some of the economic woes, suggesting that this issue not only transcends 
race, but is also premised on economic calculation's rather than racial resentment.67  
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The AVS also revealed that anxieties about fairness, equality and equal opportunity 
were of significant concern across political parties and racial groupings. According to the 
survey, 79-percent of Americans believed the economic system was unfair and 
disproportionally favored the wealthy. The breakdown by political party was 90-percent of 
Democrats, 80-percent of independents and 63-percent of Republicans. Regarding equal 
opportunity, 65-percent believed that inequalities were a significant problem and affected the 
ability of everyday Americans at having an “equal chance in life.” The results across racial 
lines, showed racial agreement on the issue, as majorities of black Americans (87-percent), 
Hispanics (73-percent), white Americans (60-percent), and white working-class Americans 
specifically (64-percent), all believed there was a substantial lack of equal opportunity or 
equal chance in life.68  
A side-effect of the neoliberal project which started to emerge around the same time 
MAP was in its Nixonian infancy, is a concept developed by Justin Gilbert known as 
‘disaffected consent,’ whereby the governed express “profound dissatisfaction” with the 
premises of neoliberalism, but because they have been unable to conceive of a “convincing 
alternative” they succumb and acquiesce, begrudgingly legitimizing the neoliberal order. An 
order that Gilbert subtly reminds “nobody actually voted for” and which only generates 
greater generalized anxiety from its social and economic implications.69 According to 
Gilbert, since the 1970’s, as MAP festered in the background, the global success of 
neoliberalism never increased its popular legitimacy, but instead, led to an unsustainable “life 
of endemic precarity.”70 Essentially, the neoliberal project is a means of what Lazzarato calls 
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“the management of inequalities” in labor, wealth, social justice, and culture.71 Historically, 
neoliberalism could prevent sustained populist surges by inciting a sense of complacency or 
‘disaffected consent’ through market manipulation, neoliberalized education, and the slow 
“erosion of civil society” causing a feeling of general relative powerlessness, but after 
continuous crises, it can no longer easily dismiss populist materializations.72 What has 
happened, could have been predicted, but came unexpectedly to the ruling elite, who could 
not envisage the level of electoral support for populist movements and politicians to increase 
or for the electorate to effectively disavow neoliberalism and conclude that populism could 
“perform better” during economic downturns and provide viable solutions to something like 
the Great Recession many Americans believe is still occurring.73  
Furthermore, Matthieu Ricard emphasized the demise of the ‘American Dream’ as a 
result of a deregulated free market, prone to unpredictability, abuses and a predatory nature 
which systematically produces “inequality, exploitation, and the monetization of…human 
life.” It is the “commercialization of values” leading to a distortion of economic activity and 
financial inefficiency which rewards the few at the expense of the many. The accumulation 
of wealth, rather than benefiting the poor through the creation of jobs and stimulating the 
economy, instead “trickled up” to the very top. The neoliberal project has entered an era in 
which the “ends of making money justifies the means” and the financial crash of 2008 and 
the governments reaction, bailing out the banks responsible, in Ricard’s assessment, is 
symbolic of that attitude.74 Consequently, according to Laura Grattan, populism is an attempt 
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to “redeem democracy…from the hegemonic powers that undermine it.” It’s a bullhorn of 
resistance against the “gradual erosion of democratic aspirations” and the insulation of 
globalized capitalism from popular control.75   
The Decline in Democracy 
 
“Populism lives deeply in our fears and expectations.” – Michael Kazin76  
 
In order to understand the continual growth of MAP, one must identify the causes that 
contribute to its existence and while this research focuses on the economic theory, there is 
another underlying cause that is attached to that thesis and in fact, at times, they work in 
tandem. According to Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, the secondary cause is the 
decline in positive opinions towards democracy and democratic regimes. Foa and Mounk 
contend that the marked rise in populist movements is related to the declining “proportion of 
younger citizens who believe” or are invested in democracy and is accompanied by a wider 
“skepticism toward liberal institutions.” They’ve labeled this effect “deconsolidation,” and 
state that it’s not just a reflection of dissatisfaction towards failed government performance, 
but it is also an outright “denunciation of liberal democracy” as a system of government.77  
This decline was unearthed in the World Value Survey which was conducted by Foa 
and Mounk. According the data, over the course of successive generations, a mounting 
“critical attitude towards democracy” and indifference has replaced positive and supportive 
attitudes. The survey observed that 46-percent of respondents reported that they either ‘never 
had’ or had ‘lost’ faith in U.S. democracy.78 Among younger citizens, specifically those born 
in the 1980’s and later, only 30-percent believed it is “essential” or necessary to live in a 
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country with democratic values and structures.79 As a result, many Western democracies’, 
including the United States, have seen a discernible rise in populist parties since 2007 and 
democracy has since been labeled an “empty vessel,” incapable of responding to citizen 
concerns related to declining standards of living or the frequent economic crises.80 Some of 
these issues, particularly the decline in the standard of living were detailed in the exhaustive 
research undertaken by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, who found that over the last 25 
years in the majority of developed democracies, the median income had remained stagnant 
and median household incomes were actually lower in 2012 than they were in 1989. 
According to Piketty and Saez, this “loss of income has been compounded by a concurrent 
loss of security” which is ultimately responsible for the economic anxiety that reinforces 
populist support.81 Since the financial crash of 2007-8, there has been a sense, according to 
Paolo Gerbaudo, that neoliberalism is failing and society has entered a “transition between 
two different political eras;” one in which the neoliberal dogma is replaced by populism to 
fill the vacuum left by the crises caused by establishment parties.82  
An outcome of this decline in support for democracy, is an anti-austerity movement 
stemming from the economic and social distress of the 2008 financial crash known as 
‘citizenism,’ with the primary goal of “reclaiming citizenship” - in the words of global 
activists, they “want to take back [their] institutions.” Gerbaudo, further claims the 
emergence of this movement is a direct result of the ongoing “erosion of citizenship” as the 
ruling political and financial elite pursue irresponsible, unpopular and “anti-social economic 
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policies.”83 According to Gerbaudo, the citizenship movement is an extension of the populist 
revolt, arguing that both movements target the same groups, notably political and financial 
oligarchies and emerge out of similar conditions, namely in response to the advance of 
neoliberal ideology and the process of economic globalization which has devalued the 
sovereignty of nation states. The language of citizenship has also been adopted by populism 
because of its ability to perceive a “common ground” in the struggle of economic victimhood 
and destitution perpetrated by elites. It serves as a “source of collective identification” in 
what Gerbaudo suggests is now a revolutionary political struggle to reform democracy 
against the unelected markets that currently control the levers of globalization.84  
Additionally, democracy has given rise to what Edward Goldberg termed the 
“newocracy,” or an aristocracy that claims, “superior insight” and benefits from continued 
globalization which has made life more expensive for the average citizen. This “newocracy” 
has established themselves as a ruling class who are the sole “arbiters of wealth and 
poverty,”85 casually picking and choosing economic winners and losers. This has created 
what John Kenneth Galbraith characterized as Americas unique economic ability to have 
“private wealth amidst public squalor.”86 Gareth Stedman Jones described this environment 
between the ruling or “parasitic” class87 and the exploited class as something beyond simple 
economics, because it’s also symptomatic of the chasm between the “beneficiaries and the 
victims of corruption and the monopoly of political power.”88  
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Katsambekis and Stavrakakis argue that the emergence of populism is usually treated 
as a form of “democratic malaise [or] social disease” that threatens the foundations of 
democracy and society in general by building a support base through the construction of an 
irrational Manichean worldview which takes advantage of an immature public and persuades 
and directs their “uncontrolled passions” towards undemocratic ends. However, this is not all 
without cause, as the scholars cite the “radical [and] brutal implementation of draconian 
austerity and neoliberal adjustment policies.” As a result, populism has witnessed a regrowth 
in an effort to reject the proposed hegemonic and oligarchic solutions to the problems 
inherent in neoliberal and globalist economic platforms. In terms of being threatening, 
populism is only viewed as a threat to economic and political elites who have chosen to 
govern without the people in the pursuit of a “brutal nihilism” perpetrated by the “pure elite” 
against the social and economic rights of the disadvantaged. In actuality, populism, when 
done right, can serve as a “corrective” against the ongoing corruption of the neoliberal elite.89  
It is actually the malaise of democracy that gives rise to political discontent, which 
according to Rooduijn, van der Brug, and de Lange, causes an increase in populist voting, 
voting against the “powers that be,” and casting ballots as a “fierce critique” against the elite 
establishment. In their study, political discontent was signified and operationalized by three 
forms of recognizable discontent; first, people believe legislators do not care about their 
opinion; second, the perception that political parties only care about a person’s vote, and not 
their opinion; third, the belief that government policy is influenced by people who don’t look 
like the voting citizenry. Their study determined that people vote for populist parties because 
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they are “politically dissatisfied,” typically resulting from the belief that they are 
underrepresented, not represented at all, or simply ignored.90  
According to Moffitt, key to explaining the populist surge as a reflection of declining 
support for democracy is the “evocation of crisis” and the increased distrust and cynicism 
aimed at governments believed to be in “thrall to global finance;” or the very people many 
citizens deem responsible for the financial recession and refugee crisis, causing widespread 
belief that there is a fundamental “crisis of democracy.” Populists, having increased their 
appeal since the 1970’s, and especially in the last decade as sovereignty and national borders 
have become less defined, have been able to post themselves as “the only true voice” 
between the people and the unrestricted “forces of globalization.” Furthermore, Moffitt 
argues that populist leaders, sensing their moment, have become adept at “exposing the 
deficiencies” of democratic institutions and appealing to an audience through implementing 
“emotionally resonant and relevant” political performances to audiences who no longer feel 
any connection to the democratic institutions or governments meant to represent them.91 The 
survival of democracy, according to Plattner, “requires the maintenance of a successful 
balance between majority rule and…minority rights,” but this balance can suffer from 
disruption and when this transpires, it results in a form of political “hypertrophy,” which is 
currently occurring. This “hypertrophy” ensues when democracy “excessively weakens the 
protections offered for individual and minority rights,”92 specifically through the course of 
privatizing natural resources, financial sectors and transferring responsibility over those areas 
to “international authorities.” The result, according to Lee Rahel Nirel, is an “acute feeling of 
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deprivation” among the masses as the state abandons crucial sectors of social security and 
public importance.93  
All of this delegitimizes the political force behind democratic governments, fosters 
distrust of the machinations of modern governance, and through the perception of crisis, 
breakdown, or threat activates the populist impetus,94 and for some scholars, populism has 
finally reached a point where it needs to be taken seriously. Katsambekis believes this latest 
surge is no mere “episodic phenomena” that will soon disappear, but rather it is a direct 
response to a “political system that is characterized by a lack of responsiveness or 
accountability.” The moral integrity of elites has been called into question allowing populist 
leaders and parties to flourish and gain legitimacy as a movement that can “better understand 
and express people’s feelings of marginalization” in a neoliberal order were economic and 
political consensus is “forced.”95 This alienation and “cartelization of political parties” has 
cultivated a political sphere that is perilously “unaware of people’s agonies and 
grievances.”96 Consequently, American democracy has descended into what Robert Michels 
labeled the “iron law of oligarchy” as concentrations of power and dominance undermined 
the pillars of democratic institutions. Instead of being “servants of the masses,” politicians 
and wealthy elites, acting through cumbersome bureaucracy, “established monopolies…and 
dominated over the apathetic rank-and-file.”97 In turn, due to the economic crisis and 
strengthening of identity politics, democracy has also entered a “nodal point,” whereby 
populist victories - provoked by a mistrust of elites, public dissatisfaction, and a vision to 
“exact revenge and punishment” against paralyzed democratic institutions which have 
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become “ungovernable” - will result in an “ideological, strategic, and…institutional 
redefinition of…democracy.”98 According to Leszek Kolakowski, the fatal flaw in 
democracy is the “self-enmity of open societies” because they lack the effective ability to 
defend against “internal enemies” thereby transforming into their “antithesis,” ultimately 
fragmenting the public space and climaxing in the rise of populism. Nearly two decades ago, 
in the midst of economic uncertainty, Kolakowski warned that the crisis of democracy was 
not “temporary” and continued economic crises would reveal the “self-poisoning nature” of 
democratic governments, permitting the rise of alternatives to appear and gain political 
viability.99  
The racism of populism 
 
“Equal rights for all, special privileges for none.” – Andrew Jackson100  
 
However, there is a prevailing counterargument to what prompts populist movements 
and it is the racism hypothesis. MAP, critics assert, is simply an updated offshoot and 
reinvention of the populist movements of Andrew Jackson, the Whigs of the 1860’s and the 
People’s Party of the 1890’s. However, unlike those historical movements, MAP, detractors 
claim, is much more adept at cloaking the appearance of racism under the pretext of 
economic anxiety. As Greven has argued, Trumpism is nothing more than similar Republican 
attempts by Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush at exploiting the racism of 
southern whites built on the same emotional appeals and exaggerations that rely on a politics 
of fear, anger and “crass simplifications.”101  
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Scholars like Grevan challenge the economic anxiety thesis, arguing that it “ignores 
the enduring power of racism” and the threat it poses to democracy. Additionally, they 
contend that if the economic anxiety theory is correct, what then, explains the lack of support 
for Trump among minority communities that have been the most harmfully impacted by 
globalization and income inequality?102 This has led some critics, like Mehdi Hasan, to assert 
that racism is the only plausible theory and support for Trump was almost exclusively a 
result of racial resentment. Hasan, citing data from the American National Election Study 
(ANES) and poll results from Gallup, claims there was a direct correlation between Trump’s 
appeal and voter attitudes about minorities, specifically, blacks, immigrants, and Muslims, as 
well as a “strong relationship between anti-black attitudes and support for Trump.”103 Like 
Hasan, Philip Klinkner’s research found that economic factors were “statistically 
insignificant” in the political rise of Trump. Instead, Klinkner found that party identification 
and racial resentment were far greater indicators of support for Trump, especially among 
Americans who held “resentful views of African Americans,” where Trump’s support 
increased by 44-points.104  
Additionally, Fareed Zakaria takes the economic thesis to task, contending that what 
matters more today and has since the 1980’s when voting patterns began shifting away from 
class, is social and cultural issues. While Zakaria admits that there has been an “economic 
stasis” resulting from pervasive globalization which limits and restricts the options 
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lawmakers can choose from when an economic crisis occurs, Trumpism and its predecessors 
are not predicated on that economic stasis, but are based on cultural fears and nationalist 
romanticism. As post-materialist politics entered the scene, younger generations became 
focused on self-expression and issues of gender, race and the environment, producing what 
Zakaria claims was a “counter-reaction” among older generations. That reaction, at its core, 
according to Zakaria, is motivated more by cultural hostilities towards race, immigration and 
mass migration and less by economic factors, like anxiety and inequality. But, even Zakaria 
notes that some of this cultural anxiety is not without justification and submits that there is a 
direct correlation between “public fears and the pace of immigration.” Therefore, populism 
that appears heartless or xenophobic is simply reacting to the fact that in America, the 
number of foreign-born residents has increased from less than five-percent in 1970 to almost 
14-percent in 2016 and every system intended to manage immigration has either failed or 
broken down because of the powerful economic interests allied with globalization.105  
Furthermore, whether real or imagined, the economics of anxiety and the decline in 
overall economic mobility has led to successive generations to perceive the influx and arrival 
of immigrants and the emergence of minority-majorities as an assault on their standard of 
living and a threat to national identity.106 This anxiety results in a type of patriotic 
nationalism that Monbiot claims is indistinguishable from racism,107 because racism is often 
interwoven and bound up with moral concerns, and in the descriptive sense it, racism 
becomes a “shallow term” because nationalist fueled populism is not simply about skin color, 
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but it’s also about the perception of minority values and whether or not they are compatible 
with the dominant culture.108  
In response to some of the opposition, specifically that which is leveled by Grevan, 
Grattan argues that the historic populist movements, and namely the People’s Party, which 
did laborer the “intensities of white privilege, racism, [and] nativism,” was actually 
mobilized through popular outrage against an emerging “corporate culture” that was partial 
to the ruling elite, industry and banking sectors. The People’s Party, in contrast to being an 
engine for virulent racism as claimed by Greven, was a vital mouthpiece in the opening salvo 
of populist resistance against escalating income inequality and their main fight was not 
founded on racial animosity, but was directed towards “rising corporate power [which] 
threatened to enslave posterity,” similar to the foundations of MAP, from the ‘Silent 
Majority’ to Trumpism.109 Furthermore, in responding to the oft repeated claim that Trump 
voters, and by extension, those who support MAP are racist, as evidenced by a Gallup study 
which revealed that Trump supporters tended to be wealthier - seemingly undermining the 
economic anxiety hypothesis since it seems incredulous to suggest that such individuals 
could or would suffer from any form of economic worry.110   
However, David Atkins suggests the Gallup study doesn’t hold up under close 
scrutiny. First, while Trump supporters tended to be wealthier on average, that wealth came 
in the form of blue-collar jobs which have been disappearing for decades. Second, those 
same voters also reside in communities that are in declining health and experience lower 
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economic mobility.111 Keane also challenges this assumption because it systematically 
dismisses the notion economic anxiety because, while some Trump supports may have 
above-average incomes, in reality, the feelings associated with economic anxiety extends 
beyond income. In fact, income is not an adequate barometer with which to measure anxiety, 
since income hasn’t changed relative to inflation and since the 1960’s, “the bottom two-fifths 
are making…almost exactly the same” in 2016 as they were then. The problem is not 
income, but the purchasing power of that income.112 It’s also the case, according to research 
done by Eva Anduiza, that populist attitudes don’t necessarily involve actual economic 
hardship, but merely the “perceptions” people have pertaining to their specific “economic 
situation.”113  
These perceptions give way to a sense of impending disempowerment and disruption 
of status, and according to Atkins, this spurs populist uprisings and the likeliest source for all 
revolutions is this mildly privileged class, not necessarily the poor.114 Of course, this 
disempowerment can take on both economic and racial dimensions, however, sometimes 
they are interrelated. As David Dayen argues, throughout American history, its sometimes 
impossible to separate those dimensions as mitigating factors concerning candidate choice. 
Even issues like slavery and Jim Crow policies, while representative of social injustice and 
racial resentment, it’s also the case that slavery was an economic institution and Jim Crow 
policies eliminated the “fear of competition for jobs.” While both forms of racial injustice are 
certainly unacceptable, it’s also true that when both institutions were eradicated, there was an 
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economic impact on previously stable segments of society, namely the white working-class. 
As a result, the emergence of economic instability “creates the conditions for xenophobic 
populist animosity.”115  
Moreover, Dayen, argues that this sense of disempowerment felt by those willing to 
support populism:  
“plays out economically, with forces beyond the control of workers 
determining the movement of their jobs, the composition of monopolistic 
organizations, and the opportunities for the future.”116  
Dayen also dismisses the notion that people vote with a singular motivation as 
opposed to being influenced by several factors, including “decades of tribal identification 
with one political party” and to suggest that racism is the only culprit, is to miss the point 
entirely and “will inevitably misinform reality,” effectively impeding any attempt at 
progress.117 Of course, this is not to dispute the role racism plays in populist attitudes, but 
evidence suggests that perceptions of economic deprivation, vulnerability and anxiety 
resulting from a very real competition over jobs, wages, and resources, is what drives the fear 
of the ‘other.’  
Zaslove argues, that rather than viewing the ‘other’ in racist terms, modern populist 
movements, both left and right, classify the ‘dangerous others’ as “special interest 
groups…international corporate interests and [aspects of] globalization.” This classification 
is explicitly detailed in the discourse and can also be found at the movements formation prior 
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to full-scale mobilization.118 Furthermore, Gest argues that claims of racism function as a 
“mute-button” used to invalidate legitimate claims of economic depression and anxiety.119 
Gest also suggests that the white working-class has been placed in an unwinnable situation. 
As economic instability and inequality have become the de-facto settings of neoliberalism, if 
the white working-class complains about policies directed to the advancement and promotion 
of minorities, they are “labeled racists.” Similarly, if they blame their woes on the economic 
modeling of the free market, they are called “lazy” and their complaints are dismissed. With 
no avenue open for expressing genuine grievances, they are muted, forgotten, invisible.120 
What is often overlooked, according to Gest, is how “poorer white people are subject to the 
same elite classism” that has subordinated minorities for centuries and because their 
whiteness attaches them to the “in-group,” regardless of actual economic standing, they are 
rendered “invisible” and become “entrenched in their deprivation.”121  
Additionally, assertions that MAP and Trump voters in general are only motivated by 
racial hatred and resentment, is a conclusion that rests on the assumption that such voters can 
be categorized and discussed as a “single unit.” In reality, they encompass a “broad spectrum 
of people with varying sets of motivations” and not only are the motivations varied, but they 
are also “economically defensible.”122 A Pew poll conducted in July of 2016 found that the 
economy was considered a “very important” issue to 84% of voters, whereas immigration, a 
key component of the racism theory, finished sixth-most important and 90% of Trump 
supporters cited economic issues as very important.123 Also, a Marketplace-Edison Research 
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Poll conducted just prior to the election found that economic anxiety had increased in the 
months leading up to November and according to the Poll’s Economic Anxiety Index, 
anxiety rose from 20-percent in 2015 to 30-percent on the eve of the election and it found 
that “30-percent of Americans were very fearful they would lose their job.” In total, sixty-
four percent of Americans reported feeling frequently anxious about the economy and their 
financial situation.124  
In an interview with Slate in 2016, John Judis challenged the racism thesis arguing 
that what occurred with Donald Trump could be traced back to the early 1970’s when 
capitalism first came under stress, in the form of the energy crisis. Since then, nascent 
populism has been bubbling under the surface as corporations, embracing the neoliberal 
strategy realized capital and labor “mobile.” Concerning labor, Judis states this mobility 
allowed corporations to employ “low wage, less educated immigrants” which puts significant 
pressure on wages and has inherent social costs in the United States. While Judis does not 
deny the existence of anti-immigrant sentiment prior to the 1970’s, he does state that the 
extent to which it has developed was only possible after the “deregulation of capital” and 
profit maximization of market liberalism that really began in the 1970’s.125  
According to Judis, the heart of Trump’s message was not the incendiary and inciting 
rhetoric about immigration which the press reported on, but in the mode of Ross Perot and 
Pat Buchanan, it was a message of economic nationalism. Like other scholars, Judis supports 
the economic theory of MAP, claiming “populist movements [are] early warning signs that a 
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worldview is breaking up [and] is under attack” and you can’t reduce complicated political 
decisions to something as simple as racial resentment. Furthermore, Judis cited the General 
Social Survey (GSS) and Obama’s improbable victory in Ohio in 2008 to undermine the 
racism theory. According to Judis, the GSS indicated the racial resentment in Ohio was at 
such a level that an Obama victory should’ve been impossible, and yet, Obama won. As a 
result, Judis concluded there was a flaw in the racism theory and stated he had become 
“suspicious of social scientists who make [those kinds] of analysis based upon statistical 
studies” because reducing things to one cultural factor dismisses all other factors, such as 
class and the economic anxiety that certain classes are susceptible too.126  
Confronting the issue of racial resentment and its relevance to white attitudes towards 
minorities and African-Americans in general, was research done by Carmines, Sniderman 
and Easter, who challenged the notion that “racism is the primary ingredient in white opinion 
on racial affairs.” In their research, they note that ‘old racism,’ based on biological 
inferiority, is no longer as prevalent and has been replaced by what some scholars have 
termed ‘new racism’, or racial resentment and animosity that is linked to traditional 
American values; i.e. white values. Values such as hard work, individualism, self-sacrifice 
and discipline that are seen as fundamental to the American character and society and it’s no 
accident that those values closely correspond with the sentiments of MAP. While some 
scholars still believe that biological forms of racism are still inherent in racial resentment, 
informing the prejudices and preferences of whites, Carmines et al, discovered that racial 
resentment is “not a valid measure of racial prejudice.” Furthermore, they argue that racial 
resentment does not provide “evidence about the extent to which racial animosity continues 
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to dominate the thinking of white Americans.”127 Instead, rather than being a reflection of 
dormant racism, this racial resentment is not tied to biology, but to policy attitudes, which 
have economic implications. This is similar to the politics-centered interpretation put forward 
by Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell who argued that theories based on racism “overestimate 
the role of racial animus.” In fact, according to their research, it is non-racial, or “race-neutral 
values” that influence policy attitudes, especially with regards to affirmative action. Under 
this approach, opposition is not based simply on the race of the recipient, but on the belief, 
especially among white Americans, that it will lead to outsized and ineffective government 
bureaucracies which undermines core populist values, most notably, “individual 
initiative.”128  
The survey published by PRRI also weakens the racism thesis as a primary motivator 
of populism, especially in terms of support for Trumpism. The survey found that as critical 
issues in terms of importance to the electorate, immigration and race relations, failed to 
constitute a majority (46-percent and 39-percent, respectively) and key cultural issues like 
same-sex marriage and abortion came in even lower, at 25-percent and 34-percent, 
respectively. Though the survey did find that 63-percent of white working-class Americans 
feel “bothered” when confronted by or coming into close proximity with non-English 
speaking immigrants, it’s more complex than basic resentment. Of those who felt bothered, 
only 43-percent were white college-educated Americans, suggesting there are inherent 
economic implications attached to the emotions of the white working-class, since they are the 
most vulnerable to job loss due to cheaper labor. Even so, as critical issues, racial and social 
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categories failed to constitute a majority, suggesting that economic conditions were of far 
greater importance to the American public.129  
Additionally, criticisms of economic anxiety, according to Ben Casselman of 
FiveThirtyEight, confuse economic hardship with economic anxiety, which are not the same. 
Casselman asserts that once you control for race, the data reveals that numerous economic 
anxieties drove support for Trump, such as voters with lower credit scores, more subprime 
loans, receiving disability payments, and lower earnings among full-time workers. As a 
result, support for Trumpism doesn’t necessarily imply support in those sections of the nation 
in the “worst financial shape” but rather it refers to “parts of America where economic 
prospects are on the steepest decline.”130 Casselman also draws attention to the point that 
there is a host of non-race related economic issues identified by Trump supporters, as well as 
in every variant of MAP that are very real, such as the fact that “manufacturing jobs have 
disappeared, wages have stagnated, economic mobility has fallen, college costs have risen, 
and the retirement system is broken.”131 Furthermore, Shannon Monnat, states that counties 
that went harder for Trump “correlated closely with mortality rates stemming from drugs, 
booze, and suicide” resulting from the economic stresses of poverty, unemployment, and 
lacking health insurance. These communities, which are mostly white, according to Monnat, 
are “literally dying” as a result of failed economic policies.132  
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
 
“…they have divided their nations into two classes, wolves and sheep.” Thomas Jefferson133  
 
A majority of methods, such as the historical research, literature review, previously 
conducted statistical analysis and an investigation of scholarly articles were chosen to 
provide context, support and additional evidence applicable to the research hypothesis that 
MAP in general and, as it is applied to the three aforementioned case studies, is caused by 
times of economic crisis. Essentially, the main hypothesis is that economic anxiety is a 
necessary condition for populism and populist movements to emerge. A secondary 
hypothesis is whether or not the theory of MAP does begin in 1972. An alternate hypothesis 
being tested, is that racial resentment is the primary cause of populism and populist 
movements. These methods allow the paper to focus on how MAP emerged post-Civil Rights 
of the 1960’s in response to declining economic conditions and discusses the events 
surrounding the cases studies, their political development, and mitigating factors behind their 
materialization, impetus and sustained existence. In addition, there is also an examination of 
historical research and scholarly articles dedicated to the alternative theory of racism as the 
cause of populist movements. Such methods were chosen because it is imperative to the 
research to have its roots in historical approaches, theories and interpretations of populism 
buttress the statistical analysis that accompanies it because data does not always tell the 
whole story, but when combined with additional research to test the hypothesis, it has the 
effect of adding credibility to the hypothesis or providing a basis for supplementary research 
and data collection in the event that the hypothesis is not confirmed.  
                                                 
133 “From Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington, 16 January 1787,” Founders Online, National Archives, last modified February 1, 2018, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-11-02-0047. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 11, 1 January–6 
August 1787, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955, pp. 48–50.] 
 
 43 
Additionally, statistical analysis was conducted on the three case studies - the 1972 
election of Richard Nixon framed around the Silent Majority, the 2010 Tea Party dominated 
mid-term elections, and the 2016 election of Donald Trump - to test the economics 
hypothesis, as well as the racism theory. Along with the development of populism and its 
basic causes, each case study is discussed and analyzed using the historical research, 
interpretations of scholarly literature, previous data analysis. Additional statistical analysis 
conducted by the author used data collected by the ANES for the years associated with the 
case studies, as well as 2010-2012 Evaluations of Government and Society special study, 
which is applicable to the Tea Party case study, to test the viability of the hypothesis – that 
populism and populist movements are motivated by economic crisis and anxiety and not 
racism.  
Starting with the earliest case study, the 1972 election of Nixon and the Silent 
Majority. The analysis for this case study was done using the ANES 1972 Time Series 
Study,134 which actually created a few logistical problems with case study comparison. First, 
this survey is much older than the other two used in this thesis, so it does not include the 
same number and variety of questions as the new surveys. Second, there were two versions 
of the questionnaire given that year, and even though both questionnaires constituted a 
representative national cross-section, the complication arises because half the sample got a 
majority of race questions and the other half got a majority of economy questions. As a 
result, the variables used in this analysis are different (and less from those used in the other 
two analyses). In order to test the racial anxiety theory, I use a feeling thermometer for blacks 
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in which respondents were asked how warmly they feel toward blacks on a scale of 1-100, 
where 100 = very warm (very positive) and 1 = very cold (negative).   
Additionally, whereas 2011 and 2016 data asked respondents about the economy in 
general, the economic anxiety variable in the 1972 dataset is the mean of two questions 
asking about the respondent’s personal financial situation. The questions were: “Does the 
respondent feel better or worse off than a year ago” and “Does the respondent feel they will 
be better or worse off a year from now.” These are measured on a 1-5 scale where 5 = worse 
off and 1 = better off, also included in Table 1. Other variables used, either as control or 
supportive of the economic anxiety hypothesis in Table 1 included age, strength of party 
identification, income and education. As with all the case studies, but perhaps more 
specifically this one because it lays the foundations of not only the theory of MAP, but of 
economic anxiety correlating with populist movements, the analysis should support the 
hypothesis that economic anxiety led the Silent Majority voting for Nixon, and not racial 
resentment.  
The second case study, concerning the Tea Party, used the ANES Evaluations of 
Government and Society Study, Survey 3 from December 2011135 which was used to 
measure public opinion in advance of the 2012 election and included questions related to 
policy issues, the economy, and attitudes toward and evaluations of President Obama. First, 
an ANOVA analysis was run to test whether the model chosen was significant. Second, the r-
square value was determined which shows how much of the variance in the dependent 
variable (DV) our independent variables (IV) explain. As the Tables will show in the results 
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section, both came back showing statistical significance, allowing the results to be 
interpreted.  
The analysis used the results of an OLS (ordinary least squares) regression based on 
the number of respondents to the survey which was 649. The DV is the respondent’s support 
for the Tea Party measured on a 1-7 scale (7 = strongly support, 1= strongly oppose). The IV 
in the model used to test the theory of economic anxiety, is the mean of two economic 
anxiety variables: “Would you say that as compared to one year ago, the nation’s economy as 
a whole is now better, about the same, or worse” and “Compared to now, do you think the 
nation’s economy will be better, about the same, or worse 12 months from now?” Both of 
these are measured on a 5-pt scale where 5 = much worse and 1= much better.  
Additionally, Table 2 included racial variables to test the alternate hypothesis that 
racial resentment is the force behind populism. The racial resentment scale is made up of four 
racial resentment questions coded as variables c3_zg_1 through c3_zg_4 in the dataset. The 
questions comprising the racial resentment scale were: Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other 
minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without 
any special favors; Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that 
make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class; Over the past few years, 
blacks have gotten less than they deserve; It's really a matter of some people not trying hard 
enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. 
Racial resentment was measured on a 5-pt scale and coded such that higher values = 
more racial resentment. There are also several control variables in the model used such as - 
respondent age, their strength of partisanship, which goes from 1-7 such that 1 is a strong 
democrat and 7 is a strong republican, respondent income, respondent education level, and 
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whether the respondent is white and whether the respondent is male. Again, the analysis was 
looking for confirmation to support the economic anxiety hypothesis for populism while 
comparing it to the alternate theory of racial resentment.  
In the final case study dealing with Donald Trump and Trumpism, the analysis used 
the ANES 2016 Time Series Study.136 The DV in this dataset is whether or not the 
respondent voted for Donald Trump, so a logistic regression was used. Again, the sample 
size, or N value, which was 2811 respondents, was found, as was the “pseudo-r-square” 
value, or the equivalent of an r-square in an OLS for a logistic regression. Table 3 shows the 
regression coefficients for the IV’s to determine the directionality and magnitude of the 
relationship between the IV’s and the DV and checked to determine the significance to see 
which variables have a significant effect on the DV. The main variables of interest again 
dealt with racial resentment and economic anxiety. In comparison to the previous two 
studies, the racial resentment questions were the same set of questions as from the Tea Party 
data from 2011. While the questions about economic anxiety contained the same two 
questions as the measure in 2011, it also included a third question, which asked whether the 
current economy is good or bad.  
For the purposes of this research, the Trumpism case study also looked at populism 
variables, which have bene included in Table 11 as well. The data consists of a summary 
scale of four questions which measured respondents’ support of populism: “Most politicians 
only care about the interests of the rich and powerful,” “A strong leader is good for the US, 
even if he bends the rules to get things done,” “the people, not politicians, should make the 
most important policy decisions, and “The will of the majority should always prevail.” This 
                                                 
136 http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_timeseries_2016/anes_timeseries_2016_userguidecodebook.pdf 
 47 
scale is measured on a 1-5 scale where 5 corresponds to the highest levels of support of 
populism and 1 the least. As with the previous two case studies, I expect to find high-levels 
of economic anxiety to support the hypothesis that such anxiety is necessary to populist 
incursions in the political process. Conversely, there is also an expectation that the data will 
reveal low-levels of racial anxiety.  
This research design was selected due to the ongoing debate surrounding populist 
motivations and whether the causal factors are economic or social and cultural. The answer 
has the potential to influence public perception, political party alignment, government 
policies and the determine the sustainability of populist movements, especially if there is a 
misunderstanding of populisms underlying causes. Furthermore, in an era of continued 
political uncertainty, shifting political paradigms - by which I mean traditional methods of 
electioneering, analyzing and interpreting public participation and attitudes have been 
upended, giving way to successful populist approaches, both rhetorically and strategically, 
which defy conventional wisdom - and with growing public resentment towards all things 
regarding the establishment; i.e. elites, governments, institutions, banks and politicians, it is 
vitally important to understand the symptoms behind this in order to better address them and 
mitigate unforeseen consequences.  
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CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES: THE AMERICAN STYLE OF POPULISM 
 
“No movement creates itself out of thin air; all reflect the deeds of their predecessors, inherit 
part of their language, aesthetics, and tactics, and absorb their victories and defeats.”137  
According to Mounk, there are four basic categories of right-wing populism, but the 
two most common which will be applied to, and are the most representative of MAP, are 
labeled “national chauvinism” and “populist traditionalism.” The former propagates the 
claim that “political elites are insufficiently proud of their country” and too willingly align 
themselves with minority groups; while the latter seeks the preservation of conventional or 
traditional lifestyles creating out-groups they fear undermine the “innocent pursuits of 
ordinary folks.”138 These two pillars of populism form the common starting point for the 
creation of the people or the movement, and in the American context, it constitutes a 
homogenous and virtuous community.139 With regards to MAP, it is occupied by “the 
heartland” which Taggart suggests is used to convey the impression of an idealized people 
who romanticize the past and the movement, according to its own logics, is not composed of 
alleged radicals or extremists, but a silent majority, or the “so-called backbone of society.”140  
MAP owes much of its existence to the history of right-wing populism or as Darren 
Warren called it “middle American radicalism.” Its historical roots lie in the farm revolts of 
the 1870’s against unsympathetic railroad companies and a series of other economic issues 
created by the “money power” or plutocracy, such as low-wages, rising debt, and prices 
being set by distant market forces.141 This led to the formation of the People’s Party in the 
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1890’s which echoed the sentiments of Jacksonian democracy, the historical equivalent of 
Trumpism. In their stated platform, they wanted to combat the economic injustice, 
oppression, and poverty being perpetrated by the “controlling influences” who, in the pursuit 
of profit, were stealing the “fruits of the toil” of the plain people.142 However, much like 
successive populist movements prior to the advent of MAP, they were undone by racially 
motivating factors and were co-opted by the two-party system that adopted the populist 
rhetoric, economic messaging and reforms to their own electoral advantage. Afterwards, the 
most notable case of populism occurred in the 1920’s amid the stock market crash and was 
led by Huey Long, who railed against the oil companies, banks and the “money power” and 
championed the average man in a desperate fight to stave off being plunged into the “abyss 
of powerlessness” by the “economic royalists.”143   
Much of Long’s rhetoric was incorporated into FDR’s messaging and policy reforms 
and once again, as swiftly as it had arrived, populism faded back into obsolescence. The final 
emergence of historical populism prior to the demarcation which ushers in the existence of 
MAP, came in the form of George Wallace, whose populism was overtly tinged with 
segregationist appeals and calls for economic equality. According to Wallace, it was a 
“movement of the people…against the tyranny of Washington bureaucrats.” However, 
perhaps Wallace’s greatest legacy was contributing to the political realignment that sent 
Richard Nixon to the White House and planted the seeds of what would become MAP, which 
was able to shed the manifest racism of Wallace and refocus on emerging appeals to 
economic tension and anxiety.144  
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In research done by Scoones et al., they argued that MAP is playing out in rural areas; 
or those most affected by “extractive capitalism” and state policies geared towards what’s 
seen as increasing financial rewards for minorities at the expense of all citizens. It’s a 
reaction to the imbalance of forces between the state and the dominated classes and mobilizes 
around economic and “moral panics” amidst disenfranchisement and rural transformations. It 
is also a reaction to the neoliberal “commodification, appropriation and extraction of rural 
resources” which appears to provide an abundance for the general population but leaves the 
rural poor fixed in “grinding poverty.” The Great Recession beginning in 2008 led to full-
blown rural “sacrifice zones” as work disappeared, homes were foreclosed, and inadequate 
medical care “destroyed the social fabric” of rural communities.145 As a consequence, rural 
communities have experienced prolonged forms of “dislocation, neglect [and] challenges to 
identity” which have produced a desperate, downward spiral into poverty and economic 
precariousness.146 It has, fundamentally, turned into a populism of despair. 
According to Codevilla, American populism is distinctive because of its attachment to 
the country class and while it may be heterogeneous in terms of regional lifestyles, intellect 
and cultures, it is still relatively homogenous in terms of racial composition. This 
homogeneity, among other things, such as religiosity and sociopolitical leanings, has led the 
country class to being overly “conscious of itself” and perceptively aware of how the ruling 
class has deemed them “humanly inferior.” Codevilla argues, that this sense of inferiority, 
perpetuated by the fact that the country class has no “privileged podium” from which to 
confront inequalities, dismissals, and insults, has created anger and frustration directed 
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towards the ruling elite in the form of disrespect and a willingness to “curtail their power and 
reduce their perks.”147  
 Codevilla also suggests that the ruling class denies the legitimacy of opposition that 
emanates from the country class, labeling it as “uninformed, stupid, [or] racist” and 
historically, this has dispirited and discredited country class opposition because they have 
lacked a political vehicle from which to mount any serious uprising.148 Elmer Clark, decades 
prior, came to a similar conclusion, stating that revolts originate mainly among the neglected 
poor, who suffer disproportionally from low education, isolated occupations and economic 
insecurity, and look to a “cosmic cataclysm which will exalt them and cast down the rich and 
powerful.”149  
 Furthermore, research done by Lipset observed elevated predispositions for 
supporting populism among rural communities faced with conditions of economic 
uncertainty and insecurity. Among this class, Lipset found “more direct frustration, 
aggression [and] venting of hostility” because of their economic isolation which provokes the 
mobilization of hostile predilections directed at the intellectual class whom they believe are 
responsible for their economic precarity.150 Applying Laclau’s populist theory, specifically 
the composition of the people, or the ‘populus,’ the only legitimate form of this in American 
populism is one that is homogenous, or as this research argues, it is predominantly white and 
is driven by perceived notions of white decline and the complexities of economic anxiety 
attached to the impression of status devaluation.151  
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More fittingly, the conception of American populism is best summed up by Kenneth 
Minogue: 
“The American populists seem to have been responding, most immediately, to 
the concrete situation of rural poverty and low prices for what they 
produced…and to proclaim that they were reacting to ‘industrial America’ 
gave populists the possibility of alliance with other non-populist groups in 
American society…”152  
The Silent Majority 
“The time has come to draw the line. The time has come for “The Great Silent Majority” of 
Americans of all ages, and of every political persuasion to stand up and be counted against 
the appeasers of the rock throwers and obscenity shouters.” - Richard Nixon153  
The first wave of MAP occurred in the aftermath of the Civil Rights movement, 
amidst the realization of inevitable white decline and the looming presence of economic 
competition over resources. The resulting elections of Richard Nixon in 1968 and 1972, 
which were campaigns heavy on populist rhetoric, gave birth to the “Silent Majority.” It also 
gave rise to indelible characteristics of MAP in the form of attacks on Washington politics, 
and anti-statist enumerations, and it established group boundaries which identified internal 
and external enemies.154 It is reactionary in form, innately assimilationist, exclusionary of 
emerging social groups and reinforces aspects of “white social democracy.”155 Since the 
1960’s, populism has been attached to the idea of ethno-nationalism and portrays itself as the 
last defense against globalism, and has been steadily progressing from a small, tepid 
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movement unable to gain ground electorally, to a movement that is capable of “upending the 
politics of a country.”156 Mudde postulates that the origins of contemporary populism lie in 
the upheaval of society and in the aftermath of the politics of the 1960’s, as national security 
threats, economic stability, and the “embrace of a business-friendly technocracy” was 
seemingly advanced at the expense of societal well-being. While MAP was incubated in the 
1970’s, Mudde suggests that it was the 1980’s when it actually started to make its mark on a 
national level during the emergence of a “new elite consensus” founded on the “transfers of 
authority [from] national governments to supranational entities” which shifted government 
responsibility from being responsive to sovereign citizens, to being beholden to institutions, 
such as the International Monetary Fund.157 Zaslove also argues that in the 1970’s, as the 
Vietnam War waned and post-war economic and political models began to “crumble,” a 
crisis of democratic legitimation was born, leaving a space for the arrival of populist 
parties.158  
As such, the ‘Silent Majority’, according to Lowndes, is comprised of Middle 
America and evokes myths central to MAP; that of law-abiding, hard-working citizens who 
espouse traditional American values.159 A central trope of MAP dates back to the Jacksonian 
era but experienced a rebirth during the Nixon years, and that is the concept of a “virtuous 
citizenry” or the virtuous middle, which extolled middle America as the responsible citizens 
of the nation.160 This virtuous middle became the foundations of Nixon’s “forgotten 
Americans” theory, which, through the rhetorical strategies of Nixon became cemented into a 
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political formation, rather than an abstraction. It emerges out of the “social question” of the 
Civil Rights revolution and the rage that followed was able to find enemies beyond racial 
categories, such as government elites and Democratic liberalism, as the forgotten Americans 
fought against condescension and being alienated as a white political coalition.161   
Common among Nixon’s populist approach was a rhetoric of polarization and 
strategies of affirmation and subversion. According to King and Anderson, affirmation is the 
selection and use of images that promote a sense of group identity, whereas subversion is the 
selection and use of images that will “undermine the ethos of competing groups.” Through 
affirmation, Nixon sought to revitalize the ‘forgotten Americans’ who he claimed were 
victims of the government and had become “ragged,” leading unfulfilled and empty lives, 
unable to achieve economic independence. They were the victims of violence, overcome by 
frustrations from the “unreason” of demonstrations in the streets. Through this antipathy 
towards outsiders and hostile groups, the ‘Silent Majority’ became a political movement, 
with a conscience and common identity. They also conceived of a common enemy, the 
hostile groups who they believed were in a “state of siege” on traditional American values 
and institutions.162   
 This formation of an enemy is a strategy of subversion and the enemy was 
exemplified by radical liberals who Vice-President Spiro Agnew at the time declared were 
“social permissivists” who excused minority violence, condemned the police and were 
responsible for the general erosion of decency and injection of lawlessness. They were also 
the congressional obstructionists, proponents of political disruptions, and lawless militants 
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who were systematically corroding the power of American society. The corresponding 
strategy of affirmation, at least in the context of the ‘Silent Majority’, has withstood over the 
years, as successive generations of Americans continue to identify with the “self-images” 
Nixon brought into being in the 1970’s.163 Another lasting legacy of this rhetorical approach, 
is how Nixon transformed the ‘Silent Majority’, for all intents and purposes, the white 
working-class majority in American society, into “victims of a tyrannical minority.” The 
‘Silent Majority’, i.e. the hard-working, traditional value holding members of rural cultures 
were being shouted down by “indecorous protestors” who were violating the democratic 
process, undermining decorous deliberation, and essentially, committing rhetorical violence 
against the members of the silent majority.164   
Echoes of the ‘Silent Majority’ can be found in Mueller’s argument pertaining to the 
logic of populism, suggesting a particular “moralistic imagination of politics” which pits the 
“morally pure” against elites who are “deemed morally inferior.” In Nixonian parlance, only 
the ‘Silent Majority’ represented the true people; the fully unified Americans who were the 
victims of the status quo, such as the downtrodden, excluded, and forgotten.165 Another key 
facet of Nixonian populism that has remained a signature component of MAP, is the direct 
attacks on the media, journalists and press corps, or as Agnew referred to them, the “nattering 
nabobs of negativism.” Attacks on the media work as direct populist appeals because they are 
visual representations of political ideologies who project a superior intellect, thus appearing 
as “impudent snobs” to the voters most likely to support and vote for populist rhetoric 
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wielding politicians. They are, in effect, an easy target to vilify in an emerging era when 
politics has taken on a semblance of being rage filled and antagonistic.166  
Scholars Kinder and Kiewiet conducted research into voter responses of the 1972, 
1974, and 1976 elections, to determine what voters perceived was their most important 
personal problem. They were also trying to determine if the “primitive self-interest [of] 
pocketbook politics,” the notion that people vote as a direct reflection of their own personal 
economic condition or if they are driven by “sociotropic politics,” which replaces the 
personal condition with that of the nation’s economic condition. What they found was that 
both played a factor. In terms of personal economic problems, voters most often cited 
“inflation…high prices and rising prices,” leading to a decline in total purchasing power and 
the failure of wages to keep pace. In the 1972 election, Kinder and Kiewiet found that of the 
most important personal problems were linked to economics and in the succeeding elections 
of 1974 and 1976, that number rose from the 45-percent in 1972, to 59-percent and 53-
percent, respectively, suggesting personal economic issues remained a source of discontent 
and frustration throughout the 1970’s.167 Since the Civil Rights movement is serving as the 
demarcation point, separating historic populism from MAP, it should be noted how the 
distinction between visible and invisible policies and which racial group they benefit is a 
defining feature of the movement and actually generates some support for the economics 
rather than racism thesis. What civil rights demands indirectly caused, was shifting policies 
that directly benefited the ‘Silent Majority’, i.e. the white working-class, such as social 
security, Medicare, the GI Bill, and collective bargaining, out of sight. In contrast, racially 
blind economics policies that assisted minorities, including welfare in particular, became 
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visible and thus more easily attacked by groups that did not benefit overtly from such 
policies. On the surface, opposition to minority centered policies would appear racially 
motivated, but the visibility of economic benefits reserved to one racial category could just as 
easily stoke economic resentment as well.168  
It should be noted that Kinder and Kiewiet argued that sociotropic, or national 
problems mattered more than personal ones, that data yields its own set of noteworthy 
results. While it is true that economic difficulties related to personal problems fell to 21-
percent as a share when combined with national problems - as Vietnam was the 
overwhelming national concern with 24-percent - it is also true that post-Vietnam in 1974 
and 1976, the most important national problems were exactly the same as the most important 
personal problems (coded as inflation, unemployment, taxes, and general economic 
problems) by a significantly large margin. In 1974, 68-percent of respondents identified one 
of those issues as the most important and in 1976, that number jumped to 74-percent. This 
suggests, that regardless of whether it was personal or national, once Vietnam is removed 
from the equation, voters were motivated by economic concerns and that is the underlying 
logic of Nixonian populism. Additionally, the CPS National Election Surveys Kinder and 
Kiewiet used for the study, found that in 1972, only six-percent of voters answered that racial 
problems or civil rights were the most important national problems and by 1976, that number 
was less than one-percent.169 This implies that the landslide election of Nixon and the birth of 
MAP is founded on economic concerns, not racist ones.    
Coincidentally, the white working-class of the forgotten ‘Silent Majority’ and 
populist inventions afterwards, weren’t always forgotten. According to Rogers and Teixeira, 
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at one time, especially from the New Deal until the 1980’s, they were key to American 
politics. However, that all started to subtly change in the 1960’s and dramatically shifted in 
the 1970’s, the demarcation point from the overtly racist style of old American populism to 
the economically charged MAP. Rogers’ and Teixeira’s argument dovetails with other 
scholarly research as they note that it was in the 1970’s when the economic realities of the 
white working-class changed. It was a reality that became defined by slow growth, declining 
wages, inflation, and stagnating living standards, which battered them economically and 
would continue to do so over the next several decades. Hence, the distinct similarities 
between the ‘Silent Majority’ and the Tea Party and Trumpism movements that follow.170  
 In the assessment of Rogers and Teixeira, the core values running throughout the 
‘Silent Majority’ were passed over and often overlooked, especially with regards to 
Democratic politicians who became focused on “liberal social programs” targeted at 
minorities. By the mid-1990’s, the silent majority demographic was also missing from most 
media accounts of current politics as well. This dearth of media attention, coupled with 
favorable economic policies that were visibly targeted at minorities, fed and fueled the 
perception, rightly or wrongly, of an unfair system biased against the white working-class. 
It’s also worth noting that Rogers and Teixeira see an inseparable link between values and 
economics, or culture and economic anxiety and a real effort needs to be made to recognize 
this and work to “reunite” the values of the white working-class with their “economic 
experience” which has been at odds since the early 1970’s.171 What makes this case 
significant in the history of MAP, according to Eva Anduiza, is that the existence of populist 
                                                 
170 Rogers, Joel, and Ruy Teixeira. “America's Forgotten Majority.” The Atlantic. October 03, 2014. Accessed April 10, 2018. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/06/americas-forgotten-majority/378242/. 
171 Ibid. 
 59 
attitudes, do not always result in support for populist parties. So, while the Nixon 
administration after the elections of 1972 and 1974 never controlled Congress, the effective 
use of the ‘Silent Majority’ laid the foundations for a future populist electorate and provided 
the “breeding ground” for future populist movements to become fully realized. With the 
foundation laid, all that was required was the existence of “opportunity structures” by way of 
economic factors and the “agency of political actors” who appear authentically populist.172  
 At the heart of Nixon’s populism, was a detestation of the “eastern elites” who lacked 
the faculties to deal with crisis, economic or otherwise. Rather it was the “uneducated” 
working-class who were vital to overcoming crisis and Nixon activated a form of bitter 
contempt for the intellectual establishment and “so-called managers” of the economy who 
were unable to prevent the economic stagnation, inflation and energy crisis. As Nixon saw it, 
the political elite were intent on taking the money of the working people and giving it to 
those who hadn’t earned it through hard-work. This was a cynical application of the Civil 
Rights agenda, but it served the function of providing an economic, or at least, a financial 
context from which ‘Silent Majority’ populism, or more aptly framed, working-class 
populism could operate.173 This “blue-collar strategy”174 targeted a constituency that was 
troubled over economic concerns, moral disruption, and the loss of financial security coupled 
with a sense of alienation as the pressing needs of this voting bloc, were seemingly ignored 
by an “unelected elite.”175 According to Jerome Rosow, the economic status of blue-collar 
workers had been of concern prior to the 1972 election, suffering from what Rosow termed 
the “economic squeeze.” This economic category had reached a “plateau in their capacity to 
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earn by promotion or advancement” and wages had become incapable of keeping pace with 
the changing social situations of American workers, most notably, that of starting a family. 
The problem was further intensified by inflation, and between 1965 and 1970, money wages 
advanced 20-percent, but real earnings, which are typically measured in purchasing power 
“remained almost static.” As Rosow put it, blue-collar workers, who were mostly white, were 
“on a treadmill, chasing the illusion of higher living standards.” This made them, to use 
Rosow’s term, “overripe” for the rhetoric and political influence of populism.176  
 Furthermore, Rosow shed light on a pervasive problem that stirs the populist passion, 
and that was the problem of restricted economic opportunity. This restriction also infected 
preceding generations born into this economic class, as the children from this group, lacking 
the advantages of elites, were early victims of neoliberalism’s economics of inequality, as 
they were incapable of “making it” or advancing to the corresponding levels of their more 
economically secure counterparts. Additionally, the perceived racial resentment of the ‘Silent 
Majority’ has underlying economic factors, like the fact that in the 1970’s, according to 
Rosow, government assistance, in the form of minimum wage, job training, and welfare 
payments, were not available to the blue-collar, white working-class, because of the 
presumption that, by virtue of being white, they had “made it,” or, as it is modernly referred 
to, they already benefited from the notion of white privilege.177 Moreover, Rosow 
commented on the economic insecurity integral to this groups composition, and rather than 
minorities being the first to suffer the degradation of economic decline, it was in fact, the 
white working-class who were the first to experience the increase in unemployment. Similar 
to modern Trump voters, the populist supporters of the 1970’s were already experiencing the 
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effects of globalization, the technocratization of democracy and economic anxiety, feeling 
“threatened by automation.” This sense of economic alienation and of being consumed by 
constant economic pressures and the frustrations at an unresponsive government, led Rosow 
to term them the very familiar, “forgotten people,” who were victims of “denigration” and a 
loss of status. Eventually, they would also form the bedrock of the ‘Silent Majority’ which 
would propel Nixon to re-election in 1972 on economic justifications.178  
The Tea Party 
“It’s a battle in a larger war. We’re in a war for the soul of this country [and] we need to 
purge both parties.” Mark Williams179  
The success of the Tea Party in the 2010 midterm elections was another manifestation 
of the “populist imagination” that was forged in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, but its 
targets were nonracial entities as much of the populist anger that fueled the movement was 
particularly directed towards liberal elites, corporations and state institutions. There was an 
acute sense among the activists that they had been betrayed by the very politicians and 
government officials they had elected to provide them with economic prosperity, opportunity 
and mobility, but they had only received financial ruin, rising inequality and had become 
victims of the economics of despair.180 They were, in the words of Berlet, angry at: 
“liberal elites, big money interests, a government that served the ‘big 
guys…they were anxious, angry, and resentful, raging against federal 
bureaucracy [and] liberal government programs…”181  
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In the tradition of MAP, the Tea Party movement represented the second era of the 
so-called white backlash, compelled by a penetrating sense of economic insecurity, ingrained 
marginalization and alienation from being excluded in a world of modern identity politics.182 
It also represented, according to Guardino and Snyder, a concrete reaction to the “crisis of 
neoliberalism” as a result of the financial crash of 2008 and the Great Recession that 
followed. A crisis that was epitomized by a public realization that a massive redistribution of 
wealth and income had been and was still occurring. It was evident in the economic numbers, 
that showed the share of wealth held by the top one-percent had increased from 10-percent in 
1980 to 23-percent in 2007. Meanwhile, over the same time frame, incomes for the bottom 
90-percent had stagnated, igniting unprecedented levels of income inequality. This level of 
redistribution has been attributed to the growth of neoliberal policies and globalization since 
the 1970’s that introduced what Guardino and Snyder termed a “vicious cycle of 
dependency.”183 Additionally, in the decades leading up to the collapse, the simmering 
economic anxiety and tension was also evidenced by the fact that from 1989 to 2012, the 
income of the poor dropped more than 8-percent and median household income had not 
recovered to its 2000 levels. Simultaneously however, income for the wealthy elite had risen 
by more than 25-percent over the same time period.184   
Nonetheless, despite economic evidence for its existence, accusations of racism were 
prevalent, as they are with any populist movement. The Tea Party, it was argued, represented 
a white working-class that was organized and voted for parties and policies to preserve 
existing constructions of social power and privilege, even if they went against their own 
                                                 
182 Hughey, Matthew W. "White backlash in the ‘post-racial’ United States." Ethnic and Racial Studies 37, no. 5 (2014): 721-730. 
183 Guardino, Matt, and Dean Snyder. "The Tea Party and the crisis of neoliberalism: Mainstreaming new right populism in the corporate 
news media." New political science 34, no. 4 (2012): 527-548. 
184 Baker, Dean. “The Rise of Populism: The Masses Have a Case” CEPR. March 27, 2017. Accessed April 10, 2018. 
http://cepr.net/publications/briefings/testimony/the-rise-of-populism-the-masses-have-a-case. 
 63 
economic self-interest, which according to critics of the movement, they almost certainly 
were violating their own self-interest. This violation, according to Lauren Langman, supports 
the notion that the Tea Party used economic appeals and the rhetoric of economic grievances 
in an attempt to “shroud its racism.”185 However, Rasmussen and Schoen argued that racism 
is an inadequate assessment of the Tea Party, especially considering that survey data revealed 
nearly one-third of Tea Party members had formerly supported President Obama.186  
But Langman also argued, that the anger and blaming elites is part and parcel of right-
wing populism and has been since it emerged in 19th century America. One of its functions is 
to allow the lower middle-class to appear blameless and innocent for their circumstances 
while continuously placing the fault on the “parasites” above, namely, the elites. In the face 
of victimization, populist movements such as the Tea Party, according to Langman, provide a 
“realm of agency” used to exonerate the lower middle-class from culpability.187 While this 
may be the case, it should be noted that among Tea Party members, almost 40-percent of 
them made less than $50,000 a year, suggesting difficulties in assigning them blame.188  
Instead, it’s more likely, that in the middle a faltering global economy that was all-
too-eager to promote corporate interests, while the economic collapse devastated the white 
working-class and left millions unemployed or underemployed, that upon interacting with 
already established populist grievances, it detonated the economic anxiety that accompanies 
downward movement on the socioeconomic ladder. So, any loss of social power or privilege 
is directly linked to economic conditions. Therefore, in the absence of economic decline, 
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wage stagnation, and job insecurity, there would be no need for the scapegoating of 
economic woes.189 Also, addressing the argument that Tea Partiers voted against their own 
economic interests, Guardino and Snyder suggest that white working-class voters prioritize 
differently than the ruling elites who subscribe to such a theory. Anyway, voting populist, in 
this case and others, serves as a method of expressing discontent and venting grievances 
towards a political system and economy that has rendered itself dysfunctional and inept. 
Externally, it acts as a protest vote, while internally, at least for the Tea Party and other right-
wing populist movements, it is a way to fulfil what they view is their “role as guardians of 
American liberty”190 and defenders of the real America - rural, white and Christian.191  
Dean Baker, refuting the racism thesis applied to the Tea Party, argues that issues of 
economic anxiety, racism and xenophobia cannot be extricated, and explicit economic factors 
cannot, and should not, be dismissed as mere covers for covert racist activity. Baker cites the 
fact that President Obama was elected twice - which seems improbable if racism were as 
pervasive as critic’s claim - and the fact that immigration had actually “slowed substantially” 
because of the Great Recession. As a result, Baker argues that it is implausible to propose 
that the resurgence of populism is a simple overreaction based on racism and xenophobia.192  
Furthermore, the economic anxiety and declining conditions were not imaginary 
constructs, but were very real circumstances and according to Baker, there was a “real 
economic basis for the anxiety” embraced by Tea Party members as the weak recovery 
resulted in not just a recession, but also the “upward distribution of income.” Baker cites 
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numerous economic numbers to explain the depth and breadth of the recession that fomented 
the anger behind the Tea Party. An analysis by the OECD in 2015 showed that in nearly 
every democratized and wealthy nation, inequality had risen dramatically over the previous 
two decades. Meanwhile, the average annual growth rate between 2011 and 2013 averaged 
1.8-percent, well below the IMF projection of 3.5-percent. While that figure is post-2010, it 
illustrates the nature of the economic decline and the inability of elites to solve the 
problem.193 Moreover, according to a CBS News survey done in 2012, the top issues that Tea 
Party members referenced being angry about, were all economically related, including health 
care reform, government spending, unemployment and the economy. Among Tea Party 
supporters, 92-percent believed the country was on the wrong track and that figure among the 
majority of Americans was 59-percent, suggesting some agreement with the Tea Party. So, it 
wasn’t just Tea Party members who had a negative view of the economic conditions 
enveloping the nation, but all Americans in general were pessimistic.194  
Another major issue for the Tea Party, according to the CBS News survey, was a lack 
of representation or at least the appearance of being underrepresented and this started with 
President Obama, as only 24-percent believed Obama understood their problems. But, it 
didn’t end with the President, as only one-percent approved of Congress, suggesting a 
massive gulf between the voters and those elected to represent them. And it wasn’t just the 
Tea Party who felt this way, because Congress was universally disliked, as just 17-percent of 
Americans approved of their performance overall. So, resentment towards the government 
was not unique to the Tea Party, but was an overall sentiment shared among the nation. 
                                                 
193 Ibid. 
194 Montopoli, Brian. “Tea Party Supporters: Who They Are and What They Believe.” CBS News. December 14, 2012. Accessed April 10, 
2018. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/tea-party-supporters-who-they-are-and-what-they-believe/. 
 66 
Additionally, contrary to the racism thesis applied to the movement, Tea Party supporters 
were more concerned with economic than social issues; 78-percent versus 14-percent, 
respectively and the economic anxiety that drove those concerns led to 93-percent to describe 
the economy as somewhat bad or worse and 42-percent believed it was actually getting 
worse. Coinciding with this sense of economic deprivation, 88-percent of Tea Party activists 
thought the economic stimulus had no impact on the economy, but again, this pessimism was 
also shared by a majority of Americans, as 62-percent had the same impression of the 
stimulus package.195 Additionally, analysis conducted by the Center for Social Inclusion 
(CSI) found that the Tea Party was in fact driven by economic anxiety and insecurity. Their 
research showed that in the midterm elections of 2010, in districts suffering from economic 
insecurity, Tea Party candidates won “9 of 10 races,” whereas, in districts where economic 
insecurity was not an issue, they “lost all but three races.”196 This indicates the wide-ranging 
pervasiveness of the economic collapse and considering a majority of Americans held similar 
opinions about the state of the economy, either non-Tea Party members are also racist 
nativists, or, economic anxiety was a major causation of the Tea Party populist revolt.   
Furthermore, Solty argues the Tea Party, in “hegemonic terms,” wasn’t a racist surge 
against President Obama, but owed its existence to the failure of the Obama administration to 
inoculate the economically vulnerable and “construct [a] post-bubble economy” to stave off 
the effects of the recession.197 This was exemplified by the Wall Street Journal, that termed 
the era “Generation crisis,” as employment shifted from a high-wage and full-time economy 
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to a “low-wage, part-time epidemic.” According to statistics cited by the Journal, 28-percent 
of all jobs were lost during the Great Recession, and of the newly created jobs, 58-percent 
were in low-wage sectors of the economy.198 This was accompanied by what Solty referred 
to as the “rate of exploitation” and the global crisis in declining wages as share of GDP. 
Citing the ILO’s Global Wage Report 2012-2013, in advanced nations, the wage share of 
GDP was almost 75-percent in 1975, but by 2010, at the height of the Tea Party, it had fallen 
to 65-percent. Incidentally, adding to the crisis, was the fact that Americans who were 
already experiencing financial difficulties, were somewhat forced to “accept lower wages and 
poorer working conditions” in efforts to prevent financial ruin and this promoted a core 
tenant of Tea Party populism; that of a lack of resources leading to “powerlessness and fear.” 
So, for Solty, the Tea Party, rather than being latent racists, were far similar to the 
“disillusioned Obama enthusiasts” who formed the nucleus of Occupy Wall Street.199   
Acknowledging this disillusioned sentiment, Thomas Frank argued that the Obama 
administration shared some of the blame for the existence and success of the Tea Party 
because of its mishandling of health care and settling for what Frank called a “cold 
consensus” that failed to embrace or channel the populist anger. It was the fault of reverting 
to “technocratic explanations” to explain the health care legislation and that, predictably, 
alienated large swaths of the public.200 Moreover, according to Chip Berlet, the situation was 
antagonized by elites who “trivialized” and dismissed the Tea Party as right-wing “crazies 
and fools”201 or as “knuckle-dragging hillbillies”202 which submerged Tea Party supporters 
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into a sense of alienation, providing them with the justification to marginalize the opposition; 
i.e. the ‘other’ or ‘enemy’ that all populism needs to exist. Accordingly, this enmity between 
the Tea Party and its opponents, is a manifestation of different cognitive frames, or more 
simply put, by a “preference for bucolic rural life [versus] urban diversity.” It also 
exemplifies how charges of irrationalism are overstated and how rural culture has always 
tended towards being “anti-urban” and harbors a suspicion of outsiders and urban culture 
because they perceive both as an “imminent danger” to their economic security and 
protection.203 What’s often overlooked, but requires consideration, is how socio-economic 
and cultural changes have combined to act as an assault on the identities of the lower middle-
class that formed the grassroots pillars of the Tea Party movement. After all, it was the lower 
middle-class that suffered most from the economic decline and coupled with a lack of access 
to healthcare and viable employment opportunities, they become forgotten, leading to the 
development of an alienated individualism. So, when the financial collapse hit and the prices 
for basic necessities such as food and fuel increased, financial hardship followed and it seems 
unreasonable that these Americans would continue to support the very people responsible for 
their economic conditions. According to Lundskow, the working middle-class suffers the 
most when economic mistakes occur, or in the case of the financial crash, when “greed and 
fraud” cause a global economic meltdown. It wasn’t the banks or corporations that suffered, 
considering that by 2010 they had seen a 65-percent increase in profits, but instead, it was 
this vulnerable group of Americans who saw a reduction in their way of life, and in part, 
instances such as this led to the populist resentment which sought a “new legitimate authority 
and an enemy to destroy.”204  
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Given the already established historical context and the fledgling MAP introduced by 
Nixon, it provided the environment during the financial crisis of 2008 for populism to evolve 
from something that what would have traditionally been a short-term trigger and turned it 
into essentially, an illiberal “turbocharged populist” response to decades of undemocratic 
neoliberal policies. Rather than dissolve quickly as a simple “episodic phenomenon” as some 
critics believed it would, Mudde argues that the global order had reached a critical juncture 
and the long simmering populist rage of the ‘Silent Majority’ had grown to the point of 
making major establishment parties “obsolete.” The Tea Party wasn’t the end, but was just 
the latest episode of American populism and it lasted far longer than anyone had 
anticipated.205 Though the Tea Party did eventually fail as a long-term populist movement 
after their electoral success in 2010, rather than disintegrate, it simply went into a form of 
political exile, but because the feeling of being “strangers in their own land” never faded, the 
movement was simply refashioned in the form of Trumpism a mere six years later.206  
Trumpism 
 
“The only antidote to decades of ruinous rule by a small handful of elites is a bold 
infusion of popular will…the people are right and the governing elite are wrong.”  
- Donald Trump207  
The composition of the Trump voter is often up for debate, but it undoubtedly 
includes those suffering from inequalities, marginalization and exclusion. It is rural areas 
which have suffered from economic poverty and fractured identities, that have made the 
formation of regressive, or populist politics possible.208 A distinctive feature of MAP, from 
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the ‘Silent Majority’ to Trumpism, is its attachment to white identity or white working-class 
voters209 and Trump especially. Justin Gest in The New Minority, argued that Trump’s 
populist appeal resulted partly from his ability to speak to, and address the “acute sense of 
loss” that permeates post-industrial communities inhabited by white populations.210 This 
demographic group, according to George Packer, are pessimistic because they feel unheard 
and “unspoken for,” left to sink alone amidst the cavalcade of “fraudulent promises” 
espoused by the ruling elite and neoliberal institutions which promised prosperity, but have 
only brought a life of precariousness, turning the white working-class in a euphemism for the 
“downwardly mobile, poor, [and] even pathological.”211   
It is a group that since the 1970’s has experienced a degeneration of sorts, becoming 
what Charles Murray described as “socially disorganized, economically dependent, culturally 
deficient and genetically debased” as a population and no longer feel protected as a racial 
category.212 Gest offered a similar assessment, arguing that the symptoms of marginalization 
and alienation were caused by “economic obsolescence and social relegation” as whites 
became convinced they had been demoted to the fringes of society213 and every increased 
demand for equality was viewed as a method to “demote white people” to the status of social 
outcast.214 This had the effect of reinforcing economic immobility and promoted political 
sorting along socioeconomic and ethnic lines. It also fostered the isolation of the working 
class and led to the segmentation of society, which unsurprisingly, led to violent, anti-system 
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political behavior, - a literal political expression of marginality that is often masked as 
populism - that has upset democratic foundations worldwide.215  
According to Chuck Collins, fundamental to Trumpism is the belief that the economy 
is rigged and it only benefits those who already have wealth at the expense of the 
disadvantaged wage earners who have been victimized by decades of accelerating 
inequalities related to income, wealth, and opportunity. More specifically, they are victims of 
policies that emerged in the 1970’s, where the seeds of the current crisis of economic 
insecurity and anxiety that accompany it, were planted.216 All of this economic suffering 
provides not only a catalyst for populism but for blame-shifting and the inculcation of a 
victimhood mentality which drifts towards “victimage” and a desire for revenge against any 
number of scapegoats, real or imagined.217 As such, Gest argues that as class cleavages 
worsened since the 1970’s, it fueled a sense of desperation among the white working-class 
who feel estranged and “resentful of ascendant minority groups,” leading to an attitude of 
inferiority and an attachment to nostalgic references of the American Dream.218 Furthermore, 
there is an awareness of loss associated with self-worth and the concept of “inherited 
poverty” which is especially prevalent among rural communities, and for them, democracy is 
just another “caste system” based on race, overlooking merit and ability in favor of 
rewarding minorities,219 who in some cases, are seen to be unfairly “cutting in line.”220  
This sense of unfairness is central to the backlash against globalization, and more 
importantly to MAP, specifically as it relates to Trumpism. The opposition stems from the 
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perception that globalization is elite driven, limits state sovereignty, is linked to growing 
bureaucratic power, destroys the organic nature of civil society and the natural economic 
order. It is implemented, operated and controlled by banks, elitist financial interests and 
multinational corporations who remain detached from the consequences that globalist 
policies initiate.221 As a result, populist movements believe that globalization provides the 
right to unelected bureaucratic institutions, such as the United Nations, IMF or the European 
Union, to interfere in the internal affairs of nations with the sole purpose of establishing a 
“totalitarian democracy”222 and installing a political system which promotes an ideology 
dominated by the “ultra-free market.”223 Additionally, according to Zaslove, globalization 
propagates policies of “de-regulation…deracination and atomization” and global forces 
attack the collective identity of the national community, destroying the “village, the parish, 
[and] rural society” in the pursuit of elitist economic interests. Really, in the view of Branko 
Milanovic, the fundamental transformation taking place within the global economy as a 
result of the Great Recession and neoliberal economics, has been the greatest reshuffle of 
individual incomes since the Industrial Revolution.224  
However, other scholars argue that the backlash to globalization has less to do with 
economics and everything to do with immigration, but immigration is inherently an 
economic matter. Proponents of globalization don’t support immigration in an effort to undo 
racism, but they do so because it brings cheap labor and sustainable power and in the process, 
local identities became displaced through a form of “cultural annihilation,” spurred on by 
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globalizations endless pursuit of profits.225 Some populists, in response to the accusations of 
prejudice, argue that it is within their rights to “reaffirm forcefully the sacrosanct right of 
people to maintain and defend their…identity and not be reduced to a residual minority” in 
their own country. As such, they are not racists, but their defensive reaction is categorized as 
patriotic.226  
The same economics hypothesis that I argue, was also explored in research conducted 
by Thomas Ferguson and Benjamin Page, who analyzed the American National Election 
Survey (ANES) for 2016 and tested for whether social appeals and attitudes mattered more 
for Trump’s success than economic arguments. The authors also mentioned Hillary Clinton’s 
attempts to magnify the incendiary rhetoric and expose the “sexist attacks…demagogic 
slurs…and dog-whistle hints of racism” as being crucial to Trump’s base of support. 
However, they also detail how this critically overlooks the concept of “material distress” 
faced by Americans, especially those living in economically stressed communities where it’s 
not just a lack of food, clothing, money and other goods, but a lack of access to quality 
education, employment and healthcare. This is where the authors note Trump’s “pro-worker 
stand” on issues that were relevant to American workers such as reducing economic harm 
from immigration and protecting workers from the wage-reducing impact of free trade 
agreements, such as NAFTA.227  
 According to Ferguson and Page’s data analysis, there is evidence to support the idea 
that Republican primary voters were “disconnected about the state of the economy” and were 
struggling to identify or find their place within the neoliberal construct. Addressing the issue 
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of racism, the authors concluded that anti-Black attitudes had “no causal impact” on Trump’s 
primary victories and other social and cultural issues, such as terrorism, women’s issues, and 
abortion, were either “not a big factor” or were “not related” to whether voters supported 
Trump. In fact, the only social issue that seemed to correlate with support for Trump was 
how voters felt towards traditional feelings or traditional values.228 What was a factor in the 
data, was a feeling of economic discontent, not only with President Obama’s handling of the 
economy, but also how voters perceived the economy was doing. The core of Trump’s 
support were those voters who believed the economy had gotten worse and would continue to 
decline, and they believed they were “worse off financially.” Although the authors did 
acknowledge instances of racially motivated voting attached to social anxiety and 
resentments, they concluded that these instances tended to have “economic roots.” This was 
especially the case in the general election where economic factors had a greater effect on 
voting behavior than it did in the primaries. In fact, in the general election, according to 
Ferguson and Page’s analysis, social issues actually cost Trump support and it was in the area 
of economic appeals where he was able to neutralize those losses. Demonstrating this point, 
is the fact that the level of discontent in the Fall of 2016 revealed that 74-percent of 
Americans “agreed that the country was on the wrong track.” Trump was aided by the fact 
that there was a widely shared view that Americas position in the world had “weakened.” In 
their final analysis, the authors concluded, that crucial to Trump’s victory was economic 
populism and the populist revolt was “more economic than social.”229 Furthermore, citing 
Pew Poll results, Judis asserted that Trump supporters were “economic populists” as 48-
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percent thought economic conditions in the U.S. were “poor” and 61-percent believed the 
economic system “unfairly” favored the ruling elite.230   
Such economic conditions and opinions limited the ability of certain voters to 
conceive of the future or to believe in promises of progress, creating a “post-apocalyptic” 
feeling, most notably, among rural Americans, who only envisioned their present condition. 
A condition where the social fabric of community seemed to be torn asunder and where they 
have been “rendered obsolete” in an ever-expanding, integrated global world,231 leading to 
the embrace of economic and political insecurity.  
 According to Mohammed Cherkaoui, Trumpism is a manifestation of the vengeful 
“forgotten white male” and the lost autonomy of hard-working citizens against the political 
establishment, ruling elites and globalization that has reduced wages for the ordinary citizen 
while “pulling up profits” for the those who implemented the very neoliberal economy that 
resulted in the Great Recession in the first place. It is a return to economic nationalism to 
undo the “politics of pain” associated with deregulation, privatization, austerity and corporate 
trade that have decimated rural sectors of the American economy. In rural counties alone, 
typically comprised of those who have constituted every American populist movement since 
Nixon’s ‘Silent Majority’, 90.5-percent chose Trump in the 2016 election over Clinton.232  
Among rural communities, Trump gave birth to what Weber termed an “anti-
economic force” from which the people could express their economic disenchantment and 
anger at a decline in economic stability.233 The sense of economic nationalism that emerges 
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in MAP has ties to the concept of American exceptionalism, or the ‘America First’ creed of 
the Trump doctrine, which was also exemplified within the Tea Party ethos and historically 
by Andrew Jackson, Trump’s historical counterpart, whose doctrine embodied similar 
Trumpism traits, including “toughness, whiteness and maleness” as well as being “deeply 
militaristic.” These elements unite the populist disposition through a deep-seated distrust and 
profound hostility towards elites.234 So, at its core, Trumpism is the pure modern 
embodiment of Jacksonian populism, which according to Walter Russell Mead,  
“…is based on the very sharp distinction in popular feeling between the inside 
of the folk community and the dark world without. Jacksonian patriotism is an 
emotion, like love of one’s family, not a doctrine. The nation is an extension 
of family. Members of the American folk are bound together by history, 
culture and a common morality. At a very basic level a feeling of kinship 
exists among Americans. We have one set of rules for dealing with one 
another; very different rules apply in the outside world.”235  
In examining the triumph of Trumpism, Steven Hahn declared it was the finality of a 
seething white rage, as the hostility of white voters boiled over into an electoral “venting of 
discontent at the consequences of globalization and immigration,” but Hahn declares as such, 
with an understanding that the two issues are inherently linked, since increased globalization 
of markets also increases the level of immigration. It was a rage against the economic 
consumerism, political isolation and distrust of government that has seemingly replaced the 
traditional values of hard work, faith, and self-reliance. Similar to the Tea Party, Trump 
voters were not driven by rudimentary racism, but by anger at the establishment and the 
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“elite pedigree” of politicians, and this is what triggered their “insecurities and sense of 
cultural inferiority.” While Hahn recognizes the role “black advancement” plays in this rage, 
it is often tied to the issues of economic independence and opportunity, and when this is 
increased for one segment of society, it logically necessitates a decrease for another segment. 
Moreover, the existence of this “racist rage,” has not occurred independently, but has 
required times of crisis and distress to materialize since the end of the 1960’s.236 In fact, 
according to Matthew Hughley, any sense of racial resentment or backlash is almost always 
dependent on the levels of “economic inequality” and when “economic resources” appear to 
be distributed to the exclusion of whites. This highlights a central issue with the politics of 
globalization, as it pits rival racial groups against one another, as they fight over “shrinking 
resources.”237  
While it is commonplace among scholars to suggest that populism requires a crisis 
and the conditions of “systemic failure,” what makes situations like Trumpism possible is not 
just a crisis, but the “spectacularization of failure” that becomes culturally or politically 
mediated. This is what allows populist actors, from Nixon to Trump, to make the failure 
“appear symptomatic of a wider problem”238 and utilize rhetorical metaphors to invoke what 
James Brassett and Chris Clarke described as a “sense of shared trauma and concern” giving 
meaning and identity to those most vulnerable in declining economic conditions.239 This also 
coincides with the argument put forth by Oliver and Rahn, who attribute the rise of Trump to 
a “representation gap” – periods when the public has felt underrepresented by elected 
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officials, specifically Congress. The authors found that since 2008, the levels of 
unresponsiveness reported by the public has been steadily increasing, giving reason to 
suggest that 2016 represented a tipping point in public sentiment against the traditional 
modes of neoliberal economics. Furthermore, the long period of economic recession and 
marginalization spurred by a growing lack of wealth and political power possessed by the 
public, allowed Trump’s candidacy to gain traction and a following, unlike, according to 
Oliver and Rahn, his previous attempt in 2000 when the representation gap was at an all-time 
low. Because the representation gap correlates with economic issues, financial pessimism, 
and mistrust of experts, rather than social and cultural issues, it made Trump’s 2016 run for 
president more viable than his attempt in 2000.240  
However, some view Trumpism not as a final, positive culmination of Nixon’s ‘Silent 
Majority’ come to fruition, but as the “politics of intolerance.” While Roth notes there does 
exist discontent within American society directed at economic stagnation, he also asserts that 
Trumpism is a national “breach on the basic principles of dignity and equality” that is 
focused on misguided outrage in response to the transformation of homogenous societies into 
multicultural unions. What is pervasive about Trumpism and right-wing populism in general, 
according to Roth, is how it tends to mythologize the past and veers towards glorifying 
“times of perceived national ethnic purity.” Even if neoliberalism is flawed, Roth claims that 
it still doesn’t lead to the same “majoritarian vision” and subjugation of its opponents like 
populism. Roth further argues, that because values and human rights are fragile, rather than 
overthrow democratic governments and international institutions which safeguard vulnerable 
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minorities, society needs to be hyper-vigilant, “lest the fears of [populism] sweep away the 
wisdom that built democratic rule.”241   
 Diverging from the economic thesis, Inglehart and Norris have described populism as 
a movement driven by insecurity, whereby xenophobia becomes realistic and they argue that 
populism is tied more specifically to cultural issues, rather than economics. The populist 
vote, according to Inglehart and Norris, is a reaction to enhanced anxiety over cultural shifts 
and the influx of foreigners who are seen to be causing a deterioration of cultural norms. In 
their research, they concluded that economic factors were weak predictors of support for 
Trump and populist parties in general, whereas, anti-immigrant attitudes tested strongly with 
support for populism. According to their data, economic issues declined in prominence 
beginning in 1983 when there was a shift towards non-economic issues, mainly cultural and 
social and polarization became more value-based and less economically class-based.242 Still 
though, Inglehart and Norris acknowledge the real decline in income, job security, and 
growing income inequality as immigrants and refugees continued to enter, unabated, into 
what’s classified as “high-income countries.” And when combined with the facts that in 
2011, during the distress of the Great Recession, the top one percent controlled 40-percent of 
the nation’s wealth; in 2012, the income gap between the one percent and the remaining 99-
percent had grown to its widest level since the 1920’s; and from 1991 to 2014, incomes 
across all educational spectrums not affiliated with the one percent, either stagnated or 
declined, a compelling case for economic anxiety remained. As a result, Inglehart and Norris 
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admitted this decline and equality gap does bear some of the responsibility for the increase in 
the popularity of populist parties since the 1970’s.243   
Others, such as Gidron and Hall, promote the idea that economics and social issues 
are interrelated; that populist attitudes and support are actually the result of an “intersection 
between economic circumstances and cultural frameworks.” Gidron and Hall suggest that 
certain frameworks, such as ones based on the celebration of diversity, which have become 
more prominent and emphasized in Western democracies since the 1970’s, has resulted in the 
raising of status anxiety for those in precarious economic circumstances. They argue that 
feelings of being “economically-underprivileged” and issues of decline regionally, rather 
than nationally, cause some voters to feel culturally distant and spatially segmented and this 
is what spurs both cultural and racial resentment. Using European democracies as a 
framework, which closely mimic the United States, especially given the nature of Brexit, 
Marine Le Pen and other populist motivations, Gidron and Hall, noted the increase in support 
for populist parties since the 1980’s. They argue that economic disadvantage is a major force 
and that cultural and social issues follow, mostly because they are attached to the concept of 
social status.244 So, when social status, defined by Weber as “a person’s position within a 
hierarchy of social prestige,”245 declines with regards to their economic position, what occurs 
is an enhanced attachment to issues of identity, increasing ethno-nationalist and anti-
immigrant sentiment and leads to voting behavior that seeks out economic preservation. A 
reason for this outcome, according to Gidron and Hall, is because social status is closely 
related to self-esteem and national identity and as they decline, the inevitable reaction is to 
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resort to emotions and permutations of hostility towards anything perceived as a threat. Like 
the issue of economic anxiety, this decline doesn’t have to be based on objective facts, but 
can be aroused through subjective attitudes and perceptions. Additionally, in data analysis 
run by Gidron and Hall, they found a direct correlation between “subjective social status and 
support for populist parties.” This perception also leads to greater resentments towards out-
groups, especially among men without a college education, which was a firmly entrenched 
Trump voting bloc. As a result, according to Gidron and Hall, there is an interactive 
relationship between economics and culture, but it is negative economic developments which 
set in motion the cultural developments and cultural mechanisms that intensify the effects.246 
Aydin-Duzgit and Keyman make a similar argument, suggesting that economic anxieties and 
cultural, or value-based fears in their assessment, are intertwined and “cut across economic 
classes,” especially as it concerns support for Trumpism.247 Furthermore, according to 
Samuel Huntington, part of what’s occurred with Trumpism and preceding populist revolts, 
is that American elites have become “dangerously out of touch with the American public 
when it comes to issues of patriotism, foreign policy, and national identity.” The role national 
identity plays in populist movements cannot be understated, as the chasm between the elite 
and the public, regarding issues of “language, culture, association, and religion” have helped 
produce the current fulcrum in American politics that is suddenly, and decidedly, leaning in 
the direction of MAP.248  
More than anything, what Trumpism represents is the end of an interregnum, or the 
transitional period that saw a “variety of morbid symptoms appear” as the ruling class lost 
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the consensus and the people finally became detached from traditional ideologies. Solty 
suggested that the initial response to compare Trumpism to 19th Century populist movements 
missed the mark, because it is much closer to the ending of an interregnum, reshaping the 
way politics is viewed, rather than a fleeting gasp of pitchfork politics.249 It is the finality of 
the “peasant struggle against neoliberal globalization”250 ushering in an “epoch of social 
revolution”251 fronted by the unheard voices that are intent on undoing the unmitigated 
damage of austerity politics. It is the victory of emancipatory politics and an act of resistance, 
especially as it relates to rural Americans, against elitist backed policies of economic 
degradation.252   
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CHAPTER 5. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
“I don’t know how you live by the identity-politics sword and don’t die by it.” – Glenn 
Loury253  
 
This chapter presents the findings of the data analysis for all three case studies 
focusing on relevant economic and racial anxiety variables and their effect on voter choice 
using data from ANES studies for the specific election years; 1972, 2010, and 2016. This 
chapter will report the findings, interpret the results and examine the impact of the findings 
on the research hypothesis that economic anxiety leads to support of populism and populist 
voting patterns. The first set of results from the data analysis is represented in Table 1 
regarding the 1972 election of Nixon and the Silent Majority.  
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Table 1: Effect of Economic and Racial Considerations on Vote for Nixon 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Male .167 .154 1.174 1 .279 1.182 
Age .024 .005 24.250 1 .000 1.024 
Strength of PID .375 .040 89.247 1 .000 1.455 
Respondent 
Income 
.085 .020 17.370 1 .000 1.088 
White 1.643 .372 19.497 1 .000 5.168 
Education .110 .037 9.107 1 .003 1.116 
Feeling 
Thermometer for 
Blacks 
-.006 .004 2.296 1 .130 .994 
Economic 
Anxiety 
-.204 .069 8.795 1 .003 .815 
Constant -4.321 .612 49.886 1 .000 .013 
Note - N=937, Cox & Snell R-square=.241, Nagelkerke R-square=.322. 
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Addressing other relevant variables first, the data suggests that in 1972, age and 
strength of party id were positive and significant, which is expected, suggesting that older 
voters and stronger republicans were more likely to vote for Nixon since they formed the 
basis for the Silent Majority coalition. Also, being white is positive and significant, though 
this again is not surprising, considering the literature suggests populist movements tend 
towards a white identity. This also aligns with the racial resentment hypothesis. Interestingly, 
and somewhat in contradistinction to the economic anxiety hypothesis, income and education 
are also both positive and significant, suggesting that wealthier and better-educated 
respondents were more likely to vote for Nixon. This may hint at the fact that economic 
factors were not working in the same way in 1972 as they are in later elections.  
However, it is a mistake to regard economic position as the end-all, be-all indicator of 
economic anxiety, since you don’t necessarily need to be poor to worry about your financial 
situation. So, just because Nixon voters were wealthier, it does not disqualify them from 
suffering economic anxiety caused by Civil Rights policies and increased competition for 
jobs, wages and resources. With that said, economic anxiety measured as significant at .003, 
but was also negative at -.204, suggesting that those who were most economically anxious 
were less likely to vote for Nixon. One way to interpret this is to acknowledge that the ANES 
used different economic measures in 1972, which makes a complete comparison to the Tea 
Party and Trumpism problematic. It is also possible that in 1972, the concept of economic 
anxiety was not as well explored or researched in terms of statistical data. However, the 
literature does suggest the existence of economic anxiety and how it affects people in ways 
not connected to their own financial circumstances. This may also be an indication that MAP, 
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in its current Trumpian form developed after 1972, does align with the overall theory that 
1972 marked the starting point of a political shift that would follow.  
Furthermore, the analysis for the feeling thermometer for blacks was negative -.006 
and not quite significant at .130, which suggests that whatever role racial issues may have 
played, it is difficult to express one way or another. Part of the problem is the lack of 
adequate measures in the dataset, and therefore, the results do not make it possible to 
conclude decisively whether racial measures predicted voting for Nixon. This is not to 
suggest they did not, just that according to the available data in the 1972 ANES survey, I am 
not able to suggest otherwise. It’s also possible, that perhaps other variables were at play, 
such as the Vietnam War, communism, or the expansion of the welfare state, which were not 
tested. Also, as the demarcation point, the data for 1972 doesn’t appear to support either the 
economic anxiety or racial resentment theory, but the hypothesis doesn’t necessarily require 
it, since it is the beginning of the paradigm shift towards economic anxiety being necessary 
for populism, though is does suggest that MAP starts at a later point. Understanding this, the 
results for the Tea Party and Trumpism analysis should recognize and express this shift and 
this is exactly what’s occurred.  
My analysis of the ANES Tea Party study shows that economic anxiety predicts 
support for the Tea Party, however, the data also indicated that racial resentment did as well.  
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Table 2: Effects Economic and Racial Considerations on Tea Party Support 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.853 .418  6.817 .000 
Economic Anxiety .264 .069 .139 3.842 .000 
Racial Resentment .123 .043 .094 2.830 .005 
Respondent Age -.004 .003 -.037 -1.201 .230 
Strength of Party ID .400 .031 .487 13.071 .000 
Household Income -.028 .014 -.069 -1.958 .051 
Respondent 
Education  
-.122 .031 -.138 -3.867 .000 
white -.260 .132 -.064 -1.965 .050 
male .023 .107 .007 .218 .827 
Note - N=649, R-square=.397. 
 
The results in Table 2 show that mean economic anxiety has a positive coefficient, 
which suggests that it has a positive relationship with support for the Tea Party. In other 
words, respondents that scored higher in economic anxiety showed stronger support for the 
Tea Party. Moreover, when you look at the last column, which shows the significance of the 
model, it’s at .000, which means that the coefficient for economic anxiety is significant. 
Therefore, the results for economic anxiety support the hypothesis.  
 The other control variables also align with the theory of MAP, such as income, which 
is negative and significant, suggesting that those who make less money are more likely to 
support the Tea Party, and the same is true of those with less education. Both conditions are 
representative of populist supporters and indicative of people most likely to suffer from 
economic anxiety.  
 However, the variable concerning racial resentment, also had a positive coefficient of 
.123, and was also significant at p<.005. This suggests that, along with economic anxiety, 
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racial resentment also played a role in whether respondents support the Tea Party. With that 
said, the variable for White is negative and significant. Because racial resentment is in the 
model, the “white” coefficient provides some evidence that whites who are low in racial 
resentment and economic anxiety, may be less inclined to support the Tea Party. Essentially, 
both hypotheses are proven true, however, it begs the questions: does economic anxiety 
cause racial resentment or is the reverse true?  
 Finally, the last case study tested economic anxiety as it applied to Trumpism. 
 
The results show that age is positive and significant, meaning that older respondents 
were more likely to have voted for Trump. Strength of Party ID is also positive and 
significant, meaning that those identifying as strong Republicans were more likely to have 
voted for Trump. In terms of the income variable, it is negative and almost significant at 
p<.054 with p<.05 acting as the cutoff. This implies that those with lower incomes were 
more likely to have voted for Trump, which aligns with the economic anxiety hypothesis.  
 
Table 3: Effects of Economic and Racial Considerations on Vote for Trump 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Male .196 .131 2.251 1 .134 1.217 
Age .013 .003 14.405 1 .000 1.013 
Strength of Party ID .875 .038 520.508 1 .000 2.398 
Respondent Education .000 .010 .000 1 .993 1.000 
Income -.014 .007 3.722 1 .054 .986 
White .199 .068 8.628 1 .003 1.220 
Racial resentment .860 .074 133.779 1 .000 2.362 
Economic Anxiety .777 .096 65.042 1 .000 2.175 
Populism .338 .100 11.378 1 .001 1.402 
Constant -10.801 .575 352.769 1 .000 .000 
Note - N=2811, Pseudo-R-square=.739. 
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 However, the variables of real interest are racial resentment and economic anxiety. As 
noted in Chapter 3, racial resentment is the same set of questions as from 2011 while 
economic anxiety comprised the same two questions as the measure in 2011, but it also 
included a third question, which asked whether the current economy is good or bad. Similar 
to the Tea Party results, economic anxiety is positive and significant, but so is racial 
resentment. Again, this suggests that both economic and racial considerations play a role. In 
addition, the populism variable discussed in Chapter 3, measured on a 1-5 scale where 5 
corresponds to the highest levels of support of populism and 1 the least, showed that the 
coefficient is positive and significant. This implies that, even when racism and economic 
anxiety are taken into account, attitudes about populism in general, played a role in the 2016 
election, which is exactly what the idea of MAP would expect. So, the results, are generally 
supportive of the hypothesis of economic anxiety being necessary for populist support, but 
how to rectify the data also supporting the alternative theory of racial resentment? I will 
address this here, rather than in the conclusion, mostly using the Trumpism case study to 
answer the question because I believe the argument is applicable to all the case studies, 
especially the more modern Tea Party. Though, sources in the Silent Majority section do 
address the issue in passing.  
 In addressing the issue of both hypotheses being supported by the data, it becomes 
important to determine what issue causes the other and I argue that economic anxiety causes 
increased racial resentment, so it is not surprising that the results showed a positive and 
significant relationship between both variables. Some of this has been addressed in previous 
chapters, in the literature review, however, it is important to revisit this again because it is 
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important to the research and the hypothesis. It’s also a topic for a future project, but for now, 
a brief interpretation of this finding.  
 First, it is vital to understand what topics were of most importance to the voters in 
2016 and according to the Pew Research Center in a survey conducted in July 2016, it found 
that the economy was “very important” to 84-percent of voters. The elements of racial 
resentment, those being immigration and treatment of racial minorities, ranked fifth and 
tenth, respectively. In terms of Trump voters only, the economy also ranked first, with 90-
percent responding it was very important to their eventual voting choice, whereas neither 
racial resentment variable rose above 80-percent. In discussing how important immigration 
was to voters, according to Pew, in 2008 and 2016, when economic anxiety was heightened, 
the issue was very important to a majority of Americans, 54-percent and 70-percent, 
respectively.254 However, according to Pew survey conducted in April 2012, which compared 
issues across elections dating back to 2004. Using the issue of the economy for economic 
anxiety and attitudes towards immigration as a stand-in for racial resentment, according to 
the survey, there is a correlation between rising importance voters place on the economy and 
immigration. From 2008 to 2010, the issue of the economy rose from 88-percent to 90-
percent, so did the importance of immigration, 54 and 58-percent, respectively. However, in 
2012, when the importance of the economy dropped to 86-percent, immigration also declined 
in importance, to 42-percent.255 And, as was mentioned previously, in 2016, both issues arose 
again in tandem. This suggests that despite the results of racial resentment in the data, the 
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driving force behind not only Trump, but also the Tea Party, was linked to economics, not 
racial attitudes.  
 Furthermore, there is evidence that suggests economic anxiety can cause racial 
resentment, which does not negate the hypothesis that economic anxiety is necessary for 
support of populism, but only suggests that economic anxiety is a far-reaching form of social 
oppression. In support of this approach, Rory McVeigh, in studying white supremacist 
movements, that economic grievances led to greater racist sentiment. Additionally, McVeigh 
wrote of white supremacist logic, that: 
“Promotion of free trade and a global economy are viewed as part of a plot 
that benefits the elite, as well as other races throughout the world, while 
reducing the standard of living for ordinary white Americans.”256  
 This is not to suggest that white supremacists are inherently Trump supporters or 
supporters of populism, but only to illustrate how economic anxiety leads to changes in 
perceptions with regards to numerous issues. Furthermore, Claudia Goldin, noted how 
people’s perceptions of immigration, a component of racial resentment, were affected by 
economic circumstances and that this has historical roots in American society. In research 
focused on the influx of immigrants between the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, Goldin found 
that almost every call for literacy tests, which were openly used as a method to curtail the 
flow immigration, were almost always preceded by economic downturns.257 Recently, Peter 
Burns and James Gimpel, in their analysis of American polls from the 1990’s, concluded 
that, economic hardship activates prejudices that are “latent,” which animates preexisting 
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views. Using ANES data from 1992 and 1996, Burns and Gimpel found that respondents 
who were “pessimistic” about their personal economic situation in 1992, were more likely to 
harbor “desultory stereotypes” and their prejudices were rooted in economic fears. Similar 
results were found in the 1996 data, but racial resentment was directed towards Hispanics, 
rather than blacks for those holding pessimistic views about their economic circumstances. 
This could be a direct result of the passage of NAFTA in 1994, as Hispanics become direct 
economic competitors. So, once again, racial resentment is a byproduct of economic anxiety 
induced by economic competition over jobs, wages and finite resources.258 
 Finally, Jeff Guo analyzed the ANES 2016 pilot study which included questions 
about preferences in the presidential primary, stereotyping, the economy, discrimination, race 
and racial consciousness. According to Guo, the study found a high correlation between 
negative views on the economy and racial resentment. Furthermore, Guo combined the 
different questions about racial resentment and created an index centered on the sentiments 
of the average American. The results indicated that attitudes of economic anxiety increase 
racial resentment because people who believed that the economy was doing “much better” 
had below-average levels of racial resentment, while people who believed the economy was 
doing “much worse,” were more likely to be racially resentful.259   
What is important to note, is that racial resentment is not the same thing as racism, 
because racial resentment is often linked primarily to policy attitudes, whereas racism is 
primarily concerned with issues of biological inferiority. As such, harboring racial 
resentment as a result of policy preferences, does not necessarily imply a supporter of 
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populism is a racist, only that they harbor prejudices at perceived economic slights and 
disadvantage.  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
“The only important thing is the unification of the people – because the other people don’t 
mean anything.” – Donald Trump260  
At its core, populism is a disenfranchised rebellion against financial and governing 
oligarchs, mobilized in the pursuit of hope and equality. In its efforts, it divides society in 
competing camps and engages in positional warfare as it promotes a real, unified people. As 
such, it acts as a sort of emancipation of the people, freeing them to express grievances, 
antagonisms and any number of anti-establishment sentiments without fear of immediate 
reprisals as the protection of the populist movement insulates and protects them. Populism 
isn’t necessarily anti-democracy, but it is a political regime within democratic institutions 
that allows for the construction of new political frontiers from which to view and assess the 
crisis, as well as invite political interventions and create political tensions and resistance 
towards globalization and oligarchization. It’s meant as a solution to ameliorate the crisis, not 
as an incendiary device enflame it. It is also a reflection that current leaders are out of ideas, 
simply regurgitating stale scripts and political gestures. Their motivations have become 
transparent and discernible, while their responses have turned evasive and unconcerned with 
the concentration of wealth and enhanced levels of inequality. Unfairness has become 
symbolic. Elite condemnation has become inescapable. And the people have become 
delegitimized as a political force. Populism is not the enemy, it is the protagonist for change 
and while it can be stated that populist movements act as an annoyance, briefly dispensing of 
political norms before receding, dying a slow death, populism as a political ideology never 
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ceases to exist in some form or capacity. So, it doesn’t suffer a slow death as much as it falls 
into a political coma until it’s called upon again to expose the political elite, as it has been 
numerous times since the Silent Majority.  
As the historical research and data analysis showed, these instances of populist 
rebellion occur in times of economic crisis or recession when economic anxiety is 
heightened.  While the data confirmed this in two of the three cases, with the 1972 Silent 
Majority/Nixon case study the outlier, it does not necessarily cause the hypothesis to be 
rejected. The 1972 case study was only meant to serve as a foundational, starting point. 
Ground zero so to speak in the formation of MAP. What is significant, is that the second two 
cases, the Tea Party and Trumpism, showed a clear correlation between economic anxiety 
and populism. That being said, a noticeable drawback of the research is the closeness 
between and recency of the Tea Party and Trumpism, and the nearly four-decade gap 
between those cases and the Silent Majority. As a result, it is almost necessary to explore 
populist movements in the intervening decades, regardless of how small. It might also be 
necessary to establish a different point of demarcation on which to pinpoint the formation of 
MAP in future research, given how economic anxiety did not lead to a vote for Nixon. The 
Silent Majority certainly played its part in providing an electoral framework from which 
future populist movements could work from, but in future iterations, I would move the MAP 
demarcation point closer to the 1980’s and test similar economic and racial variables using 
different case studies. But, perhaps the demarcation point is appropriate, but the available 
data was deficient and the 1972 election requires statistical analysis of a different set of data 
that asks questions more pertinent to the function of economic anxiety as it’s understood 
today.  
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In responding to the racial resentment that was present in the data results, as argued in 
Chapter 5, it’s not surprising. In fact, given the established and historical link between 
economic anxiety and racial resentment, it could’ve been surprising not to find a correlation 
between racial resentment and populism. I have argued, throughout this paper, that economic 
anxiety leads not just to populism, but resentful attitudes towards minorities because of 
increased competition over jobs, wages, economic status and financial security. This is a 
logical outcome of increased competition, so the correlation between racial resentment and 
populism makes perfect sense, but it’s still an inherent function of economic anxiety and 
without said anxiety, the resentment is not as powerful or impactful on election results. In 
future research, it might be beneficial to find data sources that contain more specific 
questions with regards to racial resentment so less inference needs to be made. Additionally, 
running statistical analysis on levels of economic anxiety and racial resentment over the 
course of several elections would give a better understanding of whether there is a correlation 
between them. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this research, the hypothesis was confirmed 
in two of the three cases, suggesting a clear relationship between economic anxiety and 
populist uprisings.  
Beyond further research, one thing that needs to occur, whether or not Trumpism is 
the culmination of populism with long-term sustainability or not, is an honest and open 
dialogue with populist supporters because populism does not arise from nothing. Like all 
movements, it needs a catalyst and oftentimes, populism is symptomatic of a breakdown in 
representative democracy and other dysfunctions involved with democratic systems. As the 
research indicated, populism is not borne out of simple prejudice. After all, minorities have 
been an active part in American society for most of its existence, and yet, populist 
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movements have not. It’s also difficult to locate instances of populist incursions during times 
of economic prosperity. This suggests, as does the data for the Tea Party and Trumpism 
cases, the most relevant for the thesis, that in fact, economic crisis and anxiety play a far 
larger role than any other issue in the cause of populism. And without an honest conversation 
about what led to the crisis or what is causing the anxiety, real problems are overlooked and 
people are dismissed from the political landscape and conversation and this is a systemic 
political problem democracies can ill-afford. The neoliberal hegemony, like all hegemonies 
throughout history, is not infinite and while today, the refusal to the address the economic 
problems of inequality and crisis might lead to a very visceral, albeit possibly fleeting 
populist reaction, in the future, the response could be something much worse.  
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